Question
Evaluate the effectiveness of recent monetary policy in achieving full employment and price stability.
Evaluate: Judge worth against criteria, weighing strengths against weaknesses, and conclude. Trap: Listing advantages and disadvantages with no weighting, so nothing is actually evaluated.
Thesis
Recent monetary policy has been largely effective in achieving full employment and moderately effective in achieving price stability. Its effectiveness has varied with the shock it faced in each period, and has been constrained by a blunt tool that acts only on aggregate demand, long and variable impact lags, dependence on uncertain forecasts, and little room at the zero lower bound.
Background paragraph: how the policy works
- Monetary policy is set by the Reserve Bank, independent of government, and since March 2025 decided by its Monetary Policy Board at eight meetings a year.
- Conventional policy works through the cash rate target, the rate on overnight loans between banks. It is held in a corridor: the Bank lends at the target plus 0.25 percentage points and pays a deposit rate below the target, so the market rate stays at the target.
- Transmission: cash rate → lending and deposit rates → saving and investment, cash flow, asset prices, the exchange rate and expectations → aggregate demand → output, employment and inflation.
- The dual mandate: inflation of 2 to 3 per cent, aiming at the 2.5 per cent midpoint, and full employment. The flexible, medium-term target set in 1993 anchors expectations, so firms and workers expect inflation to return to target and set prices and wages accordingly.
- Strengths: flexible, short implementation lag, independent of the electoral cycle. Limits: a blunt tool that works only on aggregate demand, an impact lag of 1 to 2 years, and little room at the zero lower bound.
- Full employment
- The lowest rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation: only frictional, seasonal and structural unemployment remain, and cyclical unemployment is zero. Benchmark: The NAIRU, estimated at about 4.25 to 4.5 per cent (Treasury assumes 4.25 per cent in the long run).Latest: Unemployment 4.6 per cent, underemployment 6.2 per cent, participation 67.1 per cent (August 2026).
- Price stability
- A low and stable rate of inflation that does not distort spending, saving and investment decisions. Benchmark: The Reserve Bank target of 2 to 3 per cent, aiming at the 2.5 per cent midpoint.Latest: CPI 3.9 per cent, trimmed mean 3.6 per cent (June quarter 2026).
Point 1 · 2020 to 2021
COVID-19: easing to the lower bound, then unconventional policy
Conventional policy was constrained at the zero lower bound during COVID-19, so unconventional tools carried the recovery, but they were left in place too long and fed the inflation that followed.
- Lockdowns cut spending sharply: real GDP fell 6.8 per cent in the June quarter 2020 and the household saving ratio jumped to 23.3 per cent.
- The cash rate was already 0.75 per cent, so conventional policy had little room before the zero lower bound.
Cash rate 0.75 (Oct 2019)→0.50 (3 Mar 2020)→0.25 (19 Mar 2020)→0.10 (4 Nov 2020)
Two emergency cuts in March 2020, then a cut to 0.10 per cent in November 2020.
Unconventional tools: a yield target on 3-year government bonds; a Term Funding Facility lending banks about $188 billion at very low fixed rates; bond purchases (quantitative easing) of about $281 billion from November 2020 to February 2022; and forward guidance that rates would not rise before 2024.
- Lower borrowing costs across the whole yield curve and keep credit flowing, so the fall in demand did not turn into mass unemployment and a deflationary spiral.
Lower rates and cheap bank funding→firms keep borrowing and hiring→unemployment peaks at 7.4 per cent (July 2020)→falls to 3.4 per cent by October 2022, below the NAIRU
- Conventional policy alone was only moderately effective because the cash rate hit the lower bound; the unconventional tools and JobKeeper did most of the work.
- Keeping credit flowing limited cyclical unemployment and the scarring (hysteresis) that followed the 1990s recession.
Rates at the lower bound and forward guidance to 2024→deflation avoided: CPI −0.3 per cent (June 2020) back to 1.1 per cent by March 2021→but easy policy kept too long→demand-pull pressure as the economy reopened→CPI 3.5 per cent by December 2021
- Effective in preventing a deflationary spiral in 2020, but the Bank's 2022 reviews found the yield target ended in disorderly fashion in November 2021 and forward guidance was read as a promise, damaging credibility when rates had to rise.
- Contributed to the demand-pull inflation of 2022 and to rapid house price growth in 2021.
- The Bank took on interest rate risk on its bond holdings, and its credibility suffered when forward guidance proved wrong.
- Time lags. Short implementation lag: cuts were made within weeks. The impact lag of 1 to 2 years meant much of the stimulus arrived after the economy had already recovered.
- Conflicts of objectives. Protecting employment in 2020 came at the cost of price stability in 2022.
- Global influences. Central banks worldwide cut to the lower bound and bought bonds, which kept the dollar from appreciating and supported confidence.
- AD/AS: an expansionary shift in AD. The zero lower bound and liquidity trap. Quantitative easing expands the money supply and lowers long-term yields.
- Diagram: AD/AS: AD shifts back to the right after the COVID-19 fall, closing a deflationary gap.
Diagrams
- Headline CPI inflation
- Trimmed mean inflation
- Cash rate target
The numbers behind this graph
| Date of effect | Cash rate target, % |
|---|---|
| 2019-06-05 | 1.25 |
| 2019-07-03 | 1.00 |
| 2019-10-02 | 0.75 |
| 2020-03-04 | 0.50 |
| 2020-03-20 | 0.25 |
| 2020-11-04 | 0.10 |
| 2022-05-04 | 0.35 |
| 2022-06-08 | 0.85 |
| 2022-07-06 | 1.35 |
| 2022-08-03 | 1.85 |
| 2022-09-07 | 2.35 |
| 2022-10-05 | 2.60 |
| 2022-11-02 | 2.85 |
| 2022-12-07 | 3.10 |
| 2023-02-08 | 3.35 |
| 2023-03-08 | 3.60 |
| 2023-05-03 | 3.85 |
| 2023-06-07 | 4.10 |
| 2023-11-08 | 4.35 |
| 2025-02-19 | 4.10 |
| 2025-05-21 | 3.85 |
| 2025-08-13 | 3.60 |
| 2026-02-04 | 3.85 |
| 2026-03-18 | 4.10 |
| 2026-05-06 | 4.35 |
- December quarter 2020
- Cash rate 0.10 per cent; trimmed mean inflation 1.3 per cent; headline 0.9 per cent
- Real cash rate
- −1.20 percentage points: policy still expansionary
- What was happening
- COVID-19: the cash rate cut to 0.25 and then 0.10 per cent, with yield curve control, term funding and bond purchases.
- Latest decision
- 6 May 2026: 4.35 per cent
- Source
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical table A2, Monetary policy changes, and monetary policy decision statements. September 2026. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, July 2026 (cat. 6401.0), tables 17 and appendix 1a; Wage Price Index, Australia, June 2026 (cat. 6345.0), table 1. CPI released 26 August 2026 (quarterly data to June 2026); WPI released 19 August 2026.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
- AS
- AD
- AD after the change
- Real output
- 851, against 807 at the start (+5.4 per cent)
- Price level
- 109.9, against 99.3 at the start (+10.7 per cent)
- Spare capacity
- 149 below capacity of 1000
- What happened
- Output rises 5.4 per cent and the price level 10.7 per cent. Most of the extra spending is going into prices: the economy is near capacity.
- What shifts AS right
- Higher productivity from new technology, skills and better management; more efficient use of resources through competition and reform; more labour and capital; lower input costs.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Point 2 · 2022 to 2024
Rapid tightening against the inflation surge
Rapid tightening from 2022 brought demand-pull inflation down without a recession, but as a blunt tool it could not address the supply shocks that caused much of the surge.
- CPI rose to 7.8 per cent in the December quarter 2022 (trimmed mean 6.8 per cent), the highest since 1990.
- Causes were both demand-pull (reopening, savings built up in 2020 and 2021, fiscal stimulus) and cost-push (supply chain disruption, the Russia-Ukraine war raising energy prices, floods raising food prices).
- Unemployment fell to 3.4 per cent in October 2022, below the NAIRU.
0.10 (Apr 2022)→0.35 (May 2022)→3.10 (Dec 2022)→4.10 (Jun 2023)→4.35 (Nov 2023)→held through 2024
Thirteen rises took the cash rate from 0.10 to 4.35 per cent between May 2022 and November 2023, the fastest tightening in a generation.
The Bank chose a "narrow path": lower inflation without a recession, preserving as much of the gain in employment as possible.
- Slow the growth of aggregate demand so inflation returned to the 2 to 3 per cent target without pushing unemployment far above the NAIRU.
Tightening slows demand→but firms hoard labour and public sector hiring (health, NDIS, aged care) grows→unemployment only rises from 3.5 per cent (June 2023) to 4.0 per cent (December 2024)
- Employment held up far better than in past tightening cycles, a success for the narrow path.
- But it shows the limit of monetary policy: the labour market stayed tighter than the NAIRU, wages growth reached 4.3 per cent (December 2023) and the short-run Phillips curve trade-off kept inflation from falling faster.
Higher rates cut household cash flow and anchor expectations→demand-pull pressure eases→CPI falls from 7.8 (December 2022) to 4.1 per cent (December 2023)→trimmed mean 3.2 per cent by December 2024
- Effective against demand-pull inflation, but a blunt tool: it could not address the supply-side causes, which eased on their own as supply chains recovered and energy prices fell.
- Non-tradables inflation stayed near 5 per cent through 2024, showing domestic, labour-driven pressure took longest to fall.
- The cost of living crisis: higher repayments came on top of higher prices.
- Dwelling construction slowed, adding to the housing shortage and to rents.
- Time lags. The Bank began raising rates later than many central banks, and the 1 to 2 year impact lag meant the full effect of the 2023 rises was felt in 2024 and 2025.
- Conflicts of objectives. The classic conflict between price stability and full employment: the narrow path accepted slower disinflation to protect jobs.
- Political constraints. The 2023 Review of the RBA led to the new Monetary Policy Board and fewer meetings, strengthening accountability.
- Global influences. Supply chain recovery and falling energy prices after 2022 did much of the work of bringing tradables inflation down.
- Demand-pull versus cost-push inflation. The short-run Phillips curve: unemployment below the NAIRU accelerates wages and prices.
- Diagram: AD/AS: AD shifts left, lowering the price level; show that a supply shock (AS left) cannot be offset without lower output.
Diagrams
- Headline CPI inflation
- Trimmed mean inflation
- Cash rate target
The numbers behind this graph
| Date of effect | Cash rate target, % |
|---|---|
| 2019-06-05 | 1.25 |
| 2019-07-03 | 1.00 |
| 2019-10-02 | 0.75 |
| 2020-03-04 | 0.50 |
| 2020-03-20 | 0.25 |
| 2020-11-04 | 0.10 |
| 2022-05-04 | 0.35 |
| 2022-06-08 | 0.85 |
| 2022-07-06 | 1.35 |
| 2022-08-03 | 1.85 |
| 2022-09-07 | 2.35 |
| 2022-10-05 | 2.60 |
| 2022-11-02 | 2.85 |
| 2022-12-07 | 3.10 |
| 2023-02-08 | 3.35 |
| 2023-03-08 | 3.60 |
| 2023-05-03 | 3.85 |
| 2023-06-07 | 4.10 |
| 2023-11-08 | 4.35 |
| 2025-02-19 | 4.10 |
| 2025-05-21 | 3.85 |
| 2025-08-13 | 3.60 |
| 2026-02-04 | 3.85 |
| 2026-03-18 | 4.10 |
| 2026-05-06 | 4.35 |
- December quarter 2022
- Cash rate 2.85 per cent; trimmed mean inflation 6.8 per cent; headline 7.9 per cent
- Real cash rate
- −3.95 percentage points: policy still expansionary
- What was happening
- Thirteen rises from May 2022 to November 2023, the fastest tightening since the 1990s, as inflation reached 7.8 per cent.
- Latest decision
- 6 May 2026: 4.35 per cent
- Source
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical table A2, Monetary policy changes, and monetary policy decision statements. September 2026. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, July 2026 (cat. 6401.0), tables 17 and appendix 1a; Wage Price Index, Australia, June 2026 (cat. 6345.0), table 1. CPI released 26 August 2026 (quarterly data to June 2026); WPI released 19 August 2026.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
- Headline
- Tradables
- Non-tradables
The numbers behind this graph
| Quarter | Headline, % | Tradables, % | Non-tradables, % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1983-12 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.2 |
| 1984-12 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 0.7 |
| 1985-12 | 8.2 | 8.5 | 8.1 |
| 1986-12 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 9.4 |
| 1987-12 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 8.7 |
| 1988-12 | 7.6 | 6.7 | 7.2 |
| 1989-12 | 7.8 | 6.5 | 7.0 |
| 1990-12 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 7.4 |
| 1991-12 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 4.6 |
| 1992-12 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 |
| 1993-12 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 3.0 |
| 1994-12 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| 1995-12 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 |
| 1996-12 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.9 |
| 1997-12 | -0.3 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
| 1998-12 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 2.5 |
| 1999-12 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.2 |
| 2000-12 | 5.8 | 3.0 | 2.2 |
| 2001-12 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| 2002-12 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 3.7 |
| 2003-12 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 4.4 |
| 2004-12 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 3.6 |
| 2005-12 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 3.5 |
| 2006-12 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.5 |
| 2007-12 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 4.1 |
| 2008-12 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 5.4 |
| 2009-12 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 2.5 |
| 2010-12 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 3.4 |
| 2011-12 | 3.1 | 1.7 | 4.0 |
| 2012-12 | 2.2 | -0.4 | 3.9 |
| 2013-12 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 3.7 |
| 2014-12 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 2.3 |
| 2015-12 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 2.2 |
| 2016-12 | 1.5 | 0.1 | 2.2 |
| 2017-12 | 2.0 | -0.3 | 3.1 |
| 2018-12 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 2.4 |
| 2019-12 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| 2020-12 | 0.9 | -0.5 | 1.5 |
| 2021-12 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 2.8 |
| 2022-12 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.5 |
| 2023-12 | 4.1 | 1.5 | 5.4 |
| 2024-12 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 3.1 |
| 2025-12 | 3.6 | 2.1 | 4.6 |
- December quarter 2023
- Tradables +1.5 per cent; non-tradables +5.4 per cent; headline +4.1 per cent
- Which is driving inflation
- Non-tradables: domestic demand, wages and capacity.
- What was happening
- The shocks unwound and tradables inflation fell to 1.5 per cent in December 2023, while non-tradables inflation stayed above 5 per cent: domestic demand and wages kept it high.
- How it is measured
- Quarterly, year-ended. Tradables are items whose prices are largely set in world markets (imports and import-competing goods, and some exports); non-tradables are items produced and sold domestically. Tradables exclude tax changes; non-tradables exclude interest charges and tax changes (RBA adjustments). Headline is all groups CPI.
- Source
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical table G1, Consumer Price Inflation (ABS and RBA). Published 30 July 2026, to the June quarter 2026.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Point 3 · 2025
Cautious easing as inflation returned to the band
The cautious easing of 2025 kept unemployment near the NAIRU, but rested on forecasts that proved too optimistic, and inflation rebounded.
- Trimmed mean inflation fell to 2.9 per cent (March 2025) and 2.7 per cent (June 2025), inside the band for the first time since 2021.
- Unemployment was low but drifting up, from 4.1 per cent (January 2025) to 4.3 per cent (June 2025).
4.35→4.10 (Feb 2025)→3.85 (May 2025)→3.60 (Aug 2025)
Three cuts of 25 basis points in February, May and August 2025, to 3.60 per cent.
- Ease gradually as inflation returned to target, to keep unemployment close to the NAIRU and avoid overshooting on the downside.
Easing supports demand→employment keeps growing→unemployment steady at 4.1 per cent by December 2025→close to the NAIRU
- Effective at holding full employment: the labour market softened only slightly after the tightening cycle.
Easing while the labour market was still tight→demand picks up; construction and services costs rise→trimmed mean back up to 3.3 per cent (December 2025)→non-tradables 4.6 per cent
- The cuts rested on forecasts that inflation would settle, and the rebound shows how uncertain those forecasts are: the Bank eased too early.
- Other factors mattered too: wage growth near 3.4 per cent, dwelling construction costs and the end of energy rebates, which monetary policy cannot target.
- Inflation re-accelerated in the second half of 2025, forcing a reversal in 2026.
- Time lags. Decisions rested on forecasts 1 to 2 years ahead; when inflation data surprised on the upside, the cuts were already working through the economy.
- Conflicts of objectives. Keeping unemployment near the NAIRU conflicted with returning inflation to the midpoint.
- Global influences. US tariff increases in 2025 raised uncertainty about global growth, one reason the Bank eased.
- Forecast uncertainty and the NAIRU: policy set on estimated, not observed, spare capacity.
Diagrams
- Headline CPI inflation
- Trimmed mean inflation
- Cash rate target
The numbers behind this graph
| Date of effect | Cash rate target, % |
|---|---|
| 2019-06-05 | 1.25 |
| 2019-07-03 | 1.00 |
| 2019-10-02 | 0.75 |
| 2020-03-04 | 0.50 |
| 2020-03-20 | 0.25 |
| 2020-11-04 | 0.10 |
| 2022-05-04 | 0.35 |
| 2022-06-08 | 0.85 |
| 2022-07-06 | 1.35 |
| 2022-08-03 | 1.85 |
| 2022-09-07 | 2.35 |
| 2022-10-05 | 2.60 |
| 2022-11-02 | 2.85 |
| 2022-12-07 | 3.10 |
| 2023-02-08 | 3.35 |
| 2023-03-08 | 3.60 |
| 2023-05-03 | 3.85 |
| 2023-06-07 | 4.10 |
| 2023-11-08 | 4.35 |
| 2025-02-19 | 4.10 |
| 2025-05-21 | 3.85 |
| 2025-08-13 | 3.60 |
| 2026-02-04 | 3.85 |
| 2026-03-18 | 4.10 |
| 2026-05-06 | 4.35 |
- September quarter 2025
- Cash rate 3.60 per cent; trimmed mean inflation 2.9 per cent; headline 3.2 per cent
- Real cash rate
- +0.70 percentage points: policy close to neutral
- What was happening
- Three cuts in 2025 as trimmed mean inflation returned to the band.
- Latest decision
- 6 May 2026: 4.35 per cent
- Source
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical table A2, Monetary policy changes, and monetary policy decision statements. September 2026. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Consumer Price Index, Australia, July 2026 (cat. 6401.0), tables 17 and appendix 1a; Wage Price Index, Australia, June 2026 (cat. 6345.0), table 1. CPI released 26 August 2026 (quarterly data to June 2026); WPI released 19 August 2026.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
- Long-run Phillips curve (at the NAIRU)
- Short-run Phillips curve, expected inflation 2.5%
- Short-run curve once expectations catch up
- Inflation
- 2.9 per cent, with unemployment at 4.25 per cent and the NAIRU at 4.50 per cent
- What happens
- Unemployment is 0.25 points below the NAIRU. Firms compete for scarce workers, wages rise faster than productivity and inflation rises to 2.9 per cent, above the 2.5 per cent people expected. As expectations rise the short-run curve shifts up (dashed), so holding unemployment here means ever faster inflation. Inflation accelerates.
- Lowering the NAIRU
- Move the NAIRU slider left: microeconomic and labour market policies that cut structural, frictional and long-term unemployment shift the long-run curve left, so unemployment can be lower without accelerating inflation.
- About the model
- Illustrative numbers. The short-run curve passes through expected inflation at the NAIRU; the long-run curve is vertical because, once expectations adjust, unemployment settles at the NAIRU whatever the inflation rate.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Point 4 · 2026
Tightening again after the oil shock
The 2026 tightening responds to an oil shock monetary policy cannot fix, and is likely to be effective in anchoring expectations only at the cost of higher unemployment.
- Underlying inflation had already risen in late 2025. From March 2026 conflict in the Middle East closed the Strait of Hormuz and Brent crude rose 59 per cent in the month.
- CPI reached 4.1 per cent (March quarter) and 3.9 per cent (June quarter 2026); trimmed mean 3.6 per cent; non-tradables 4.8 per cent.
3.60→3.85 (4 Feb 2026)→4.10 (18 Mar 2026)→4.35 (6 May 2026)→held in July and August
Three rises back to 4.35 per cent by May 2026, with forward guidance that unemployment needs to rise for inflation to fall.
The Bank expects inflation to return to the midpoint only in late 2027.
- Stop the oil shock and the tight labour market embedding higher inflation in wages and expectations, accepting slower growth and higher unemployment.
Slower spending→weaker labour demand→unemployment 4.1 (January) to 4.6 per cent (August 2026)→full-time jobs fall 6,000 in August
- Unemployment is rising towards, and probably above, the NAIRU. The Bank is deliberately trading employment for price stability, which is effective only if the rise stays modest.
Rises and firm forward guidance→anchor inflation expectations→limit second-round effects of the oil shock on wages→trimmed mean steady at 3.6 per cent (May to July 2026)
- Credible tightening stops underlying inflation rising further, but monetary policy cannot increase the supply of oil: the cost-push part of inflation has to pass through.
- The judgement is still open, with the midpoint not expected until late 2027.
- Monetary policy is working against fiscal policy: the fuel excise cut and Budget deficit add to demand while rates rise.
- Time lags. The impact lag means the 2026 rises will do most of their work in 2027, which is why the Bank expects the midpoint only in late 2027.
- Conflicts of objectives. The sharpest conflict between price stability and full employment since 2022.
- Political constraints. Fiscal relief for the cost of living added to demand, making the Bank's task harder.
- Global influences. The oil price shock is imported; a domestic interest rate cannot change world energy supply.
- Cost-push inflation and second-round effects; inflation expectations; the policy mix.
- Diagram: AD/AS: AS shifts left (oil shock); tightening shifts AD left to limit the rise in the price level at the cost of output.
Diagrams
- AS
- AD
- AS after the change
- AD after the change
- Real output
- 742, against 807 at the start (−8.1 per cent)
- Price level
- 98.3, against 99.3 at the start (−1.0 per cent)
- Spare capacity
- 183 below capacity of 925
- What happened
- Output and prices both fall: a fall in aggregate demand, with rising unemployment.
- What shifts AS right
- Higher productivity from new technology, skills and better management; more efficient use of resources through competition and reform; more labour and capital; lower input costs.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
- Headline
- Tradables
- Non-tradables
The numbers behind this graph
| Quarter | Headline, % | Tradables, % | Non-tradables, % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1983-12 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 8.2 |
| 1984-12 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 0.7 |
| 1985-12 | 8.2 | 8.5 | 8.1 |
| 1986-12 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 9.4 |
| 1987-12 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 8.7 |
| 1988-12 | 7.6 | 6.7 | 7.2 |
| 1989-12 | 7.8 | 6.5 | 7.0 |
| 1990-12 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 7.4 |
| 1991-12 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 4.6 |
| 1992-12 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 |
| 1993-12 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 3.0 |
| 1994-12 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| 1995-12 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 4.0 |
| 1996-12 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.9 |
| 1997-12 | -0.3 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
| 1998-12 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 2.5 |
| 1999-12 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 2.2 |
| 2000-12 | 5.8 | 3.0 | 2.2 |
| 2001-12 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| 2002-12 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 3.7 |
| 2003-12 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 4.4 |
| 2004-12 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 3.6 |
| 2005-12 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 3.5 |
| 2006-12 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.5 |
| 2007-12 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 4.1 |
| 2008-12 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 5.4 |
| 2009-12 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 2.5 |
| 2010-12 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 3.4 |
| 2011-12 | 3.1 | 1.7 | 4.0 |
| 2012-12 | 2.2 | -0.4 | 3.9 |
| 2013-12 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 3.7 |
| 2014-12 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 2.3 |
| 2015-12 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 2.2 |
| 2016-12 | 1.5 | 0.1 | 2.2 |
| 2017-12 | 2.0 | -0.3 | 3.1 |
| 2018-12 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 2.4 |
| 2019-12 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.0 |
| 2020-12 | 0.9 | -0.5 | 1.5 |
| 2021-12 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 2.8 |
| 2022-12 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 7.5 |
| 2023-12 | 4.1 | 1.5 | 5.4 |
| 2024-12 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 3.1 |
| 2025-12 | 3.6 | 2.1 | 4.6 |
- June quarter 2026
- Tradables +2.4 per cent; non-tradables +4.8 per cent; headline +3.9 per cent
- Which is driving inflation
- Non-tradables: domestic demand, wages and capacity.
- What was happening
- Non-tradables inflation rose again to 4.8 per cent in 2026 as capacity pressures built, even with tradables inflation inside the band.
- How it is measured
- Quarterly, year-ended. Tradables are items whose prices are largely set in world markets (imports and import-competing goods, and some exports); non-tradables are items produced and sold domestically. Tradables exclude tax changes; non-tradables exclude interest charges and tax changes (RBA adjustments). Headline is all groups CPI.
- Source
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical table G1, Consumer Price Inflation (ABS and RBA). Published 30 July 2026, to the June quarter 2026.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Judgement
Monetary policy has been most effective against demand-driven swings: it prevented deflation in 2020 and brought demand-pull inflation down without a recession. It has been least effective against supply shocks and when it relied on forecasts that proved wrong, as in 2021 and 2025, so its record since 2020 is effective in direction but imperfect in timing.