HSC Study

Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements

The advantages and disadvantages of multilateral agreements against bilateral ones, then the EU, APEC, NAFTA and the USMCA, ASEAN and RCEP, the CPTPP and Australia's own bilateral agreements, each with what it has delivered and what it has cost as of 2026.

75 min · HSC Topic One - The Global Economy

Assumes you have read Trading Blocs, Monetary Unions and Free Trade Agreements.

The full teaching. Start here.

The short version

Multilateral and regional agreements

  • For: less trade diversion, because fewer cheap suppliers are left outside; one set of rules across many markets; small economies can bargain as a group; they can be stepping stones to wider liberalisation.
  • Against: slow to negotiate, and concessions made to reach consensus leave the most protected sectors untouched; they can slice the world into rival blocs; small members may have little say inside a large bloc.

Bilateral agreements

  • For: fast, flexible, and able to go deep on services, investment and standards; the only route open while the WTO's Doha Round has stalled.
  • Against: the most trade diversion; a separate set of rules of origin for each one, which is the noodle bowl; the larger partner sets the terms; they undermine the most favoured nation principle and create interests that resist wider reform.

The named agreements, each for one idea

  • EU: the deepest bloc, which negotiates as one. Its common agricultural policy has long cost Australian farmers.
  • APEC: 21 economies with voluntary goals. The Bogor goal of free trade by 2020 was missed.
  • NAFTA to USMCA: tighter rules of origin in 2020, then US tariffs in 2025 that spared compliant goods, and a July 2026 review that did not extend it.
  • ASEAN and RCEP: an 11 member free trade area with low internal trade, and the region wide agreement built on it.
  • Australia's bilateral agreements: 19 in force. ChAFTA delivered growth and then showed that an agreement does not stop a partner using trade as pressure.

Multilateral against bilateral: the general case

Both kinds of agreement short of the WTO are preferential. What differs is how many economies are inside the preference and how hard the agreement is to reach.

Multilateral or regionalBilateral
NegotiationSlow. Every member has an interest, and consensus rules let any one of them block.Fast. Two interests to reconcile, and an agreement can be concluded in a year or two.
DepthShallow where members differ most, because concessions are traded to reach agreement.Can go deep on the issues the two partners agree about, such as services, investment and the movement of people.
DiversionLower. With many members inside, fewer cheap suppliers are left outside the preference.Higher. One partner is favoured over every other supplier in the world.
Bargaining powerA small economy can join a coalition of similar economies.The larger partner sets most of the terms.
Rules of originOne set of rules across the whole membership.A separate set per agreement, which firms must document separately.
Effect on the systemCan extend to the whole membership and sits closer to the most favoured nation principle.Cuts across most favoured nation treatment, and creates interests that then resist broader liberalisation.
Most favoured nation principle

The WTO rule that a member must extend the same treatment to every other member. Preferential agreements are the main permitted exception, which is why the proliferation of such agreements weakens the principle without breaking it.

The noodle bowl. With hundreds of overlapping agreements in force, a firm exporting a good assembled from parts made in four economies must work out which agreement gives the best treatment and document origin accordingly. The compliance cost falls hardest on small firms, and the result is that a preference is often not used. This is the practical reason economists prefer multilateral liberalisation: one set of rules for everyone has no origin problem at all, because there is no preference to police.

Stepping stones or stumbling blocks. The case for bilateral and regional agreements is that they are the only route available when the multilateral one is blocked, that they can go further than a multilateral deal on services and investment, and that lessons from them can later be applied at the WTO: rules on digital trade were written in regional agreements first. The case against is that each preference creates producers who would lose it under general liberalisation, and who then lobby against it.

Investor state dispute settlement. Some agreements let a foreign investor sue the host government before an international tribunal rather than in domestic courts, if a policy change damages the investment.

Investor state dispute settlement (ISDS)

A clause in a trade or investment agreement that allows a foreign investor to bring a claim against the host government before an international arbitration tribunal. Its purpose is to protect investors from expropriation; the criticism is that it lets investors challenge legitimate public policy.

Australia has direct experience of both sides. Philip Morris used a Hong Kong investment treaty to challenge plain packaging of tobacco in 2011, and lost on jurisdiction in 2015 after Australia spent years defending the claim. A Singapore company owned by Clive Palmer has since brought claims against Australia under AANZFTA over Western Australian legislation. The current government's policy is to exclude ISDS from new agreements and to seek its removal from existing ones, and the agreement with the United Kingdom has none.

Security of supply. Since the pandemic, governments have judged agreements less by the tariff cuts they deliver and more by whether they diversify supply. That favours agreements with several reliable partners, and it is part of why agreements now form across regions rather than within them.

What lifts this to a Band 6

The strongest version of the argument is about sequencing rather than about types. Bilateral agreements were a rational response to a blocked multilateral system, and they have also made the multilateral system harder to restart, because each agreement creates producers who benefit from the preference and would lose it under general liberalisation. That is a stepping stone and a stumbling block in one sentence.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

Compare the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. (4 marks)

Hint 1Set the comparison on two axes: how hard the agreement is to reach, and how much trade it diverts.

Hint 2Bargaining power and rules of origin are the two points most responses leave out.

Hint 3Finish with the sequencing argument: why bilateral agreements grew, and what that has done to the multilateral system.

The blocs side by side

The major regional agreements differ in size far more than their names suggest, and in how deep their commitments go. Select a bloc to read what its structure means for its members.

The major blocs comparedShare of world output, 2024: European Union 17.5, USMCA 29.9, RCEP 27.6, CPTPP 14.4, ASEAN 3.6, Mercosur 2.6.European Union17.5USMCA29.9RCEP27.6CPTPP14.4ASEAN3.6Mercosur2.60102030Share of world output, 2024 (%)
Size and depth are different things. RCEP holds over a quarter of the world's people and output, but its commitments are shallow. The EU is smaller by output than the USMCA and has a twentieth of the world's people, yet it is the only bloc in which most of what members export is sold to each other. When a question asks about the advantages of a multilateral agreement, the size of the market is one answer; how far the agreement goes inside it is the other.
The numbers behind this graph
BlocStructureMembersWorld output, %World population, %Output, US$ trillionExports to members, %
European UnionCustoms union and single market; 21 members share the euro2717.55.519.561.0
USMCAFree trade area329.96.333.4
RCEPFree trade area1527.628.430.8
CPTPPFree trade area1214.47.316.1
ASEANFree trade area, with a stated economic community113.68.54.022.5
MercosurCustoms union42.63.33.0
1
1
Bloc
European Union
Structure
Customs union and single market; 21 members share the euro
Members
27
Share of world output, 2024
17.5 per cent, about US$19.5 trillion
Share of world population, 2024
5.5 per cent
Goods exports sold to other members
61.0 per cent (2025)
What it is evidence of
The deepest integration anywhere, and the only bloc here where most of what members export goes to each other. A customs union negotiates as one, so the EU's agreements with Mercosur and Australia in 2026 were made by the Union for all 27 members at once.
Source
World Bank; Eurostat; ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office; 2024 output and population; intra-EU share 2025; intra-ASEAN share 2024

Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.

Two readings from the figure. The largest agreements by output, USMCA and RCEP, are among the shallowest: a free trade area and an agreement whose tariff cuts are modest. The deepest, the EU, is smaller than either. Depth and breadth trade off, because every extra member brings interests that have to be accommodated.

World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2024 values, accessed September 2026.

The European Union

What it is. 27 members with about 450 million people and 17.5 per cent of world output in 2024: a customs union with a common external tariff, a single market in goods, services, labour and capital since 1993, and for 21 members a shared currency. It began as the European Economic Community of six members in 1958.

Advantages

  • Scale inside the bloc. Firms supply 27 markets under one set of rules, and 61 per cent of members' goods exports in 2025 went to other members, the highest share of any bloc.
  • Negotiating power as one. A customs union negotiates with outsiders as a single party, which gives even small members access to agreements they could not have won alone. The EU signed its agreement with Mercosur in January 2026 and concluded one with Australia in March 2026, both for all 27 members at once.
  • Free movement of labour and capital, which lets workers and investment move towards where they earn most.

Disadvantages

  • Protection against outsiders. The common agricultural policy subsidises EU farmers and takes close to a third of the Union's budget for 2021 to 2027. The surpluses it produced were sold abroad below cost and lowered world prices, which cost Australian farmers markets for decades, and it is why agriculture was the hardest part of every EU agreement, including Australia's.
  • Loss of national control. Members give up their own external trade policy, and euro members give up their own currency and interest rate, which the debt crisis of 2010 to 2012 showed can deepen a recession.
  • Political strain. The United Kingdom voted to leave in June 2016 and left on 31 January 2020. Even the Mercosur agreement divided the Union: in January 2026 the European Parliament voted by 334 to 324 to ask the Court of Justice whether it was lawful, and it has been applied provisionally since 1 May 2026 while that question is decided.
  • Slower growth. The EU's share of world output has fallen over several decades as Asia has grown faster.

European Commission; European Parliament press release, 21 January 2026; Eurostat, 2026; World Bank, World Development Indicators.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

The EU signed a trade agreement with Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) in January 2026. Days later the European Parliament voted by 334 to 324 to refer it to the Court of Justice, and its trade provisions have applied provisionally since May 2026.

Using this agreement, assess the advantages and disadvantages of agreements between trading blocs. (5 marks)

Hint 1Both parties are customs unions. What does that let each of them do in a negotiation?

Hint 2Who inside the EU gains, and who loses, from lower tariffs on South American farm goods?

Hint 3What does the close vote show about agreements that must satisfy many members at once?

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

What it is. A forum of 21 economies around the Pacific, formed in 1989 on an Australian initiative, including the United States, China, Japan, Russia and Australia. It has no treaty and no binding commitments: members agree goals and pursue them voluntarily.

Advantages

  • Open regionalism. APEC members cut barriers on a non discriminatory basis, so the reductions apply to outsiders as well. That avoids trade diversion altogether, which no preferential agreement can claim.
  • A forum for economies at very different stages of development, and one of the few meetings where the leaders of the United States and China sit at the same table each year.
  • Groundwork for binding agreements. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the CPTPP that replaced it, began in discussions among APEC members.

Disadvantages

  • Goals without enforcement. The Bogor goals of 1994 set free and open trade by 2010 for advanced members and 2020 for developing ones, and neither was met. APEC replaced them in 2020 with the Putrajaya Vision 2040, which sets no deadline for free trade at all.
  • Non tariff barriers persist, because a voluntary forum can agree principles but cannot require members to change their regulations.

The evaluation is that APEC's contribution was the unilateral tariff cuts its members made in its first decades, which it encouraged but did not require, rather than any agreement it concluded.

From NAFTA to the USMCA

What it is. A free trade area between the United States, Mexico and Canada, with 29.9 per cent of world output in 2024, the largest of any agreement. NAFTA took effect in 1994 and was replaced by the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement on 1 July 2020.

Advantages

  • Complementary economies. It joined two high income economies with Mexico's lower cost labour, so production specialised by stage. Car and parts supply chains now cross the borders several times, and Mexico's exports reached a record of about US$665 billion in 2025, over 80 per cent of them to the United States.
  • Market access for the smaller members. Canada still sent more than 70 per cent of its goods exports to the United States in 2025. Access to the largest market in the world is the whole point of the agreement for both smaller members.
  • Protection in a tariff war. When the United States imposed 25 per cent tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods in 2025, goods that met the USMCA's rules of origin were exempt. The share of US imports from Mexico claiming the agreement rose from about half in 2024 to about 80 per cent by July 2025, and from under 40 per cent for Canada to a similar level.

Disadvantages

  • Job losses in manufacturing in parts of the United States and Canada as plants moved to Mexico. This was the political case for renegotiation.
  • Tighter rules of origin in 2020. A car now needs 75 per cent regional content, up from 62.5 per cent under NAFTA, and 40 to 45 per cent of its value made by workers earning at least US$16 an hour. That is a preferential agreement renegotiated in a more protectionist direction, and the compliance cost is real: the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas noted that shifting to compliance to escape the tariffs was "not free".
  • Dependence on one partner. Concentration gave the United States the stronger hand over both neighbours in 2025. Canada responded by selling elsewhere: its share of goods exports going to the United States fell from 75.9 per cent in 2024 to 71.7 per cent in 2025, the lowest since the early 1980s.
  • An uncertain future. At the joint review in July 2026 the United States declined to extend the agreement, while Mexico and Canada supported extension. Reviews now take place each year, and the agreement ends on 1 July 2036 unless all three agree to extend it. Its tariff treatment is unchanged in the meantime.

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2025; Statistics Canada, 2026; INEGI, 2026; Office of the United States Trade Representative, July 2026.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

In 2025 the United States imposed a 25 per cent tariff on imports from Mexico and Canada, but exempted goods that met the USMCA's rules of origin. The share of US imports from Mexico claiming USMCA treatment rose from about 50 per cent in 2024 to about 80 per cent by July 2025.

Explain why the share of imports claiming the agreement rose, and what this shows about rules of origin. (4 marks)

Hint 1Before 2025, what did a firm save by claiming USMCA treatment on a good that paid a low US tariff anyway?

Hint 2After the tariff, what did it save?

Hint 3Claiming the preference has a cost. What is it?

ASEAN, AANZFTA and RCEP

What it is. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Timor-Leste became its 11th member on 26 October 2025, the first new member since Cambodia in 1999. The ASEAN Free Trade Area was agreed in 1992, and the group now has about 8.5 per cent of the world's population and 3.6 per cent of world output.

Advantages

  • A hub for wider agreements. ASEAN negotiated as a group with larger partners, and those agreements became the base for RCEP, which since 2022 has joined ASEAN with China, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand: 15 economies with 27.6 per cent of world output. Its tariff cuts are modest, because most members already had agreements with each other; its real contribution is a single set of rules of origin across the region, which is the noodle bowl being untangled.
  • Bargaining power for small economies. Brunei, Laos and Cambodia negotiate with China and Japan as part of a group they could not match alone.
  • Investment into regional supply chains. Transnational corporations spreading production out of China have moved into Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand, and a free trade area lets components cross between them untaxed.

Disadvantages

  • Low trade among members. Only 22.5 per cent of ASEAN members' trade in 2024 was with each other, down from 25.1 per cent in 2010. Its members have similar endowments and export to the same outside markets, so the free trade area creates less trade than one between complementary economies.
  • Wide development gaps. Singapore's income per person is many times that of Myanmar or Timor-Leste, and there is no regional fund to help the poorer members adjust, so commitments are uneven and phased.
  • Consensus decision making, which makes the group slow and lets any member block.

AANZFTA, the agreement between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, took effect in 2010 and is Australia's link into this network. An upgrade signed in 2023 added simpler rules of origin, digital trade and a chapter on trade and sustainable development, which shows agreements being maintained rather than signed once.

ASEAN Secretariat; ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2024 values.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

The share of ASEAN members' trade conducted with other ASEAN members fell from 25.1 per cent in 2010 to 22.5 per cent in 2024, even though the ASEAN Free Trade Area had removed most tariffs between members.

Which statement best explains this?

Select one answer

Hint 1A falling share does not mean falling trade.

Hint 2Think about what ASEAN economies produce and who buys it.

Hint 3Members with similar endowments have less to sell each other.

The CPTPP: an agreement that competes for members

What it is. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership: the eleven economies that proceeded after the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, joined by the United Kingdom in December 2024. Its 12 members produced 14.4 per cent of world output in 2024.

Why it matters for this dot point. It is a regional agreement that is no longer regional. Costa Rica's accession was substantially concluded in May 2026, Uruguay's application is advancing, and the members have opened talks with the EU and with ASEAN. China and Taiwan both applied in 2021, and neither has been admitted, which shows that membership of a deep agreement is now a strategic question as well as an economic one.

Advantage and disadvantage in one. Its rules on state owned enterprises, labour, digital trade and the environment go further than any WTO agreement. Those same rules are why some large economies cannot join, so the agreement's depth limits its breadth.

Australia's bilateral agreements

Australia followed the global pattern. The multilateral route stalled, so the bilateral route was taken: the agreement with New Zealand from 1983, with Singapore, Thailand and the United States in 2003 to 2005, with Korea, Japan and China in 2014 and 2015, with Indonesia in 2020, and with India and the United Kingdom in 2022 and 2023. The agreement with the United Arab Emirates took effect on 1 October 2025, making 19 in force.

The effect on where Australia's imports come from was large: 36 per cent came from agreement partners in 2010 and 74 per cent in 2022.

Austrade, 2026; WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2025-03.

ChAFTA: the agreement that shows both sides

What it is. Australia's agreement with China, in force since December 2015. It removed Chinese tariffs on most Australian agricultural, resource and manufactured exports over a phase in period, and raised the threshold for screening private Chinese investment.

Advantages

  • Trade growth with the largest partner. China took 29 per cent of Australia's exports in 2024-25, and two way trade was A$309 billion, 24 per cent of Australia's total.
  • Tariffs on beef, dairy, wine and seafood fell to zero or close to it, giving Australian producers an edge over competitors without an agreement.

Disadvantages

  • No protection against political pressure. From 2020, after Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19, China restricted imports of Australian barley, wine, coal, timber, beef and lobster, while every tariff commitment in the agreement stayed in force. Most were lifted in 2023, wine and beef in 2024, and the last, on live lobster, on 20 December 2024.
  • Concentration. The agreement deepened dependence on one market, which is what made the restrictions costly.
  • Gaps in coverage. Wheat, cotton, sugar and rice were left out, and critics argued that the investment screening concessions were too generous.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025; Austrade.

What lifts this to a Band 6

Use ChAFTA for both halves of an evaluation and the response will be far better than one that lists benefits. The agreement delivered the gains predicted for it, and the same concentration that produced the gains was what made the restrictions after 2020 costly. Diversification and market access are not the same objective, and an agreement advances one while weakening the other.

The agreements since: diversification as the goal

  • A-UKFTA (in force 31 May 2023): over 99 per cent of Australian goods exports to the United Kingdom enter duty free, with quotas on beef, sheep meat, sugar and dairy that expand over about a decade until tariffs are gone. It has no ISDS. The criticism came mostly from the United Kingdom, where farmers objected to the competition and a former environment secretary called it not a very good deal for the UK.
  • India ECTA (in force December 2022): an interim agreement that removed tariffs on most Australian resource exports and on some agriculture, with a fuller agreement still under negotiation.
  • Australia–UAE agreement (in force 1 October 2025): Australia's first in the Middle East, removing over 99 per cent of tariffs by 2029 on two way trade of A$12.7 billion in 2024-25, and the first Australian agreement with a chapter on trade with First Nations businesses.
  • Australia–EU agreement (concluded 24 March 2026): talks collapsed in 2023 over agricultural access and resumed in 2025. 98 per cent of Australian exports will enter the EU duty free and over 99 per cent of EU tariffs on Australian goods will go. Signing is expected at the end of 2026 or early 2027, and it is not yet in force.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Austrade, 2025 and 2026.

The common thread is diversification. Each agreement after 2020 was sold at least partly as a way to reduce reliance on China, which is a security of supply argument as much as a trade creation one.

Why the multilateral track stalled and the bilateral one did not

The WTO's Doha Round opened in 2001 and has never concluded. What it did produce arrived in pieces: the Trade Facilitation Agreement agreed at Bali in 2013, which cut customs delays rather than tariffs, and the decision at Nairobi in 2015 to end agricultural export subsidies. Both are real, and both are narrow compared with what the round set out to do.

Three reasons explain the stall, and they are the same reasons bilateral agreements multiplied in its place:

  • Consensus among the entire membership. Every member must agree, so any one of them can block. The membership grew and diversified after China acceded in 2001, and the interests to be reconciled grew with it.
  • Agriculture. The advanced economies would not give up farm support, and the developing economies would not open manufacturing and services without it. Neither side moved.
  • Dispute settlement stopped working. The Appellate Body lost its quorum from December 2019 because new members were not appointed, so a losing party can appeal into a void. The rules still exist; the enforcement does not.

Chain of reasoning

  1. The multilateral round stalls because consensus among the full membership cannot be reached
  2. Governments that still want liberalisation pursue it with partners who already agree
  3. Bilateral and regional agreements proliferate, each with its own tariff schedule and rules of origin
  4. An exporter faces a different rule for every market, so the administrative cost of trading rises even as tariffs fall
  5. The gains are concentrated in large firms able to bear that cost, and the discrimination against non-members grows

A tariff cut made at the WTO applies to every member at once under most favoured nation treatment, with no rule of origin to prove and no partner discriminated against. The same cut made bilaterally applies to one partner and creates a new rule for everyone else, which is the strongest argument that the multilateral track is worth defending even when it delivers slowly.

Common mistake

Why it happens:

Wrong: the growth of free trade agreements shows that the world is moving towards free trade.

Why it happens: the agreements have "free trade" in the name, and there are more of them every year.

Right: a preferential agreement is discriminatory by construction. It lowers barriers against members and leaves them against everyone else, which is not free trade but managed trade with a chosen list. Whether it raises welfare depends on whether it creates more trade than it diverts, and the proliferation of agreements is as much a symptom of multilateral failure as a sign of liberalisation.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

The number of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in force has risen steadily since 2001, the year the WTO's Doha Round opened.

Which statement best describes what this proliferation shows?

Select one answer

Hint 1Ask what a preferential agreement does to an economy that is not a member of it.

Hint 2The Doha Round opening in 2001 and the agreements multiplying afterwards is not a coincidence. Which caused which?

Hint 3Two things can be true at once: more liberalisation, and more discrimination.

Why the larger partner gains more from a bilateral agreement

A bilateral agreement between a large and a small economy looks symmetrical on paper and is not in practice. The small economy's exporters gain access to a market many times their own, which is a large gain for them; the large economy's exporters gain access to a small market, which matters little. So the small economy wants the agreement more, and the side that wants an agreement more concedes more to get it: on investment rules, intellectual property and the sectors excluded.

This is the logic behind the notes' point that small economies are better off bargaining in a group. ASEAN negotiating with China as ten, now eleven, members, or the CPTPP setting rules that bind Japan and Canada alike, gives small members terms a bilateral negotiation would not. It is also why the United States in 2025 preferred to negotiate bilaterally with each trading partner: bilateral bargaining favours the larger party.

Does a regional agreement fragment the world?

The worry, from the notes and from the economics literature, is that regional blocs slice the world into self-contained areas. The evidence is mixed. Blocs have not raised their external tariffs, and most new agreements now cross regions rather than consolidating within them, which is the opposite of fragmentation. But the 2025 US tariffs and the USMCA exemption show how quickly an agreement can become a wall around a region when the largest member chooses to use it that way.

Putting it together

Essay planpriority 14 of 16 · 20 marks

Discuss the contribution of international organisations and trade agreements to economic growth and development in the global economy.

Discuss
Present issues from more than one side.
Thesis
The organisations and the agreements built the rules that made globally distributed production viable, so their contribution to growth is real, but it has been uneven between trade and finance, weakest where developing economies needed it most, and is now eroding as enforcement lapses and preference replaces general liberalisation.
  1. Binding trade rules made market access predictable, which is what allowed production to be distributed across borders.

    The mechanism is predictability rather than the tariff cut itself. A firm choosing where to build an export plant is committing capital for a decade, and a bound tariff is a commitment that a unilateral reduction is not.

    Theory
    Comparative advantage extended to tasks rather than to finished goods, which requires the tariff a component crosses to be low and, more importantly, to stay low.
    Diagram
    The gains from trade diagram, with the world price line as the market access an agreement makes durable.
    Evidence
    The GATT rounds and the Uruguay Round that created the WTO in 1995 lowered and bound tariffs on manufactured goods; by 2022, 55 per cent of world imports entered duty free at the ordinary rate; the USMCA exemption from the 2025 US tariffs protected exactly the trade the agreement bound.
    Against
    The Doha Round never concluded, so agricultural protection in advanced economies survived, and the economies that most depend on agricultural exports gained least from the system.
  2. Crisis lending contained financial crises that would otherwise have spread, at a cost borne by the borrowing economy.

    The evaluative point is that the severity of conditions tracked the size and wealth of the borrower, which is a criticism that can be evidenced rather than asserted.

    Theory
    A balance of payments gap closes either through official lending or through a contraction deep enough to cut imports, and crises transmit to other economies through trade and financial channels.
    Diagram
    The IMF programme model, with the loan slider showing the substitution between official support and domestic contraction.
    Evidence
    IMF programmes in Asia in 1997 and 1998 required sharp tightening in economies whose problem was private debt and the contractions overshot; lending after 2008 was larger and lighter in conditions; the general allocation of Special Drawing Rights in 2021 added reserves to every member during the pandemic.
    Against
    Conditionality repeatedly deepened the recession it was meant to shorten, most severely in Greece after 2010, where the Fund later accepted it had underestimated the fiscal multiplier.
  3. The shift from multilateral rounds to preferential agreements kept liberalisation moving and made the system less efficient.

    The sequencing argument is the one that earns the top band: agreements were a rational response to a blocked system and have made the system harder to unblock, because each preference creates producers who would lose from general liberalisation.

    Theory
    Trade creation against trade diversion. A preference lowers the price but moves purchases away from the cheapest supplier, so the net effect depends on the partner and the tariff.
    Diagram
    Trade creation and trade diversion, with the partner's cost set above the world price so the diversion rectangle exceeds the creation triangles.
    Evidence
    384 notified agreements in force by June 2026, each with its own rules of origin; the share of world imports from agreement partners up from 37 to 52 per cent between 2010 and 2022, with only 23 per cent able to use a preference; RCEP consolidating rules of origin across fifteen economies; Australia's 19 agreements.
    Against
    Preferential agreements were the only route available once the multilateral one closed, and they have gone further on services, investment and digital trade than any WTO agreement has managed.
  4. Development institutions shaped where growth turned into development, and their reach is small relative to the flows that now dominate.

    The honest assessment is that these bodies set direction more than they supplied resources, and that their record on development is weaker than the record of trade rules on growth.

    Theory
    Development needs capital that private markets will not supply at an affordable price, and standards and goals coordinate aid that would otherwise be fragmented.
    Diagram
    None. This paragraph is carried by evidence.
    Evidence
    World Bank project lending and IDA concessional credits, with its distinctive value visible when private lending stopped in 2020; the Sustainable Development Goals directing aid to 2030, with the UN's own reviews finding a small share of targets on track; the OECD minimum corporate tax agreement endorsed by the G20 in 2021, which addresses the profit shifting that costs developing economies revenue.
    Against
    Private capital flows and bilateral lending, including China's Belt and Road programme, now exceed what these institutions provide, so their influence rests on where they lend rather than on how much.

Judgement

Substantial but conditional and declining. The contribution was largest where a body held an instrument, in WTO rules and IMF lending, and smallest where it relied on persuasion. The shift from multilateral rounds to preferential agreements after Doha has kept liberalisation moving while making the system less efficient and less favourable to small economies, so the architecture that produced growth is not the architecture now in place.

The full response also needs: If the question is set on development rather than growth, the case study and development lessons supply the evidence on where the gains did and did not reach. If it is set on Australia, ChAFTA and the agreements of the 2020s, from the UK to the EU, replace the third paragraph.

Exam question

Hardest asked · about 15 min

8 marks

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral and bilateral trade agreements for the global economy. (8 marks)

Hint 1Lead with the analytical distinction, creation against diversion, and let everything else follow from it.

Hint 2Discuss needs a position. The defensible one is about sequencing: preferential agreements were the rational response to a blocked multilateral system and have made it harder to restart.

Hint 3Bring in rules of origin, bargaining power and at least one named agreement in force since 2020.

Where students lose marks on this one
  • Producing two lists of advantages and disadvantages with no mechanism connecting them.

    Why it happens: The dot point is phrased as two lists.

    Derive both lists from creation and diversion. Every advantage and disadvantage in this dot point is a consequence of the preference being extended to some suppliers and not others.

  • Using only agreements signed before 2010.

    Why it happens: Textbook examples date from the period when they were new.

    RCEP, the agreements of the 2020s and the Chinese trade restrictions from 2020 are what make the response current, and each carries an evaluative point rather than just a date.

Written for this site.

Exam question

Hardest asked · about 11 min

6 marks

Analyse the effects of regional trade agreements on the economies that join them and on the global trading system. (6 marks)

Hint 1Members first: what the agreement does to prices, output and the location of production inside the bloc.

Hint 2Then the system: what a dense network of regional preferences does to the most favoured nation principle and to the cost of trading.

Hint 3Use RCEP, ASEAN and the European Union rather than describing agreements in the abstract.

Where students lose marks on this one
  • Describing the history and membership of each bloc in turn.

    Why it happens: The notes are organised bloc by bloc, so the response follows the notes.

    Organise by effect, on members and on the system, and use the blocs as evidence inside that structure. A description of the European Union earns nothing on its own.

  • Claiming regional agreements are simply a step towards global free trade.

    Why it happens: The stepping stone argument is the optimistic one and is easy to state.

    It is one of two arguments and the evidence is mixed. Each preference creates beneficiaries who resist general liberalisation, which is the stumbling block case, and a response that gives only one side is not analysing.

Written for this site.