Trading Blocs, Monetary Unions and Free Trade Agreements
The three kinds of agreement and the ladder of integration from free trade area to monetary union, what a preference actually does to trade, how much world trade really moves under preferences, and what a shared currency costs its members.
60 min · HSC Topic One - The Global Economy
Assumes you have read Economic Forums: the G7 and the G20.
The full teaching. Start here.
The short version
Three kinds of agreement, by how many economies sign:
- Bilateral: two economies, such as the agreement between Australia and China.
- Regional or plurilateral: a group, usually but no longer always in one region, such as ASEAN or the CPTPP.
- Multilateral: the whole WTO membership, which is where tariffs are cut for everyone at once.
The first two are more accurately preferential agreements: they give named partners better access than everyone else. That preference is the whole difference from free trade, and it produces two effects that are always both present.
- Trade creation: the lower price shifts purchases from expensive domestic production to cheaper imports. A gain.
- Trade diversion: imports shift from the cheapest producer in the world to the partner, because only the partner's goods avoid the tariff. A loss.
The ladder of integration, each step adding to the one below it:
- Free trade area: no tariffs between members, each keeps its own tariffs against outsiders (USMCA).
- Customs union: add a common external tariff (Mercosur).
- Common market: add free movement of labour and capital (the EU single market).
- Monetary union: add one currency and one central bank (the euro area, 21 members since Bulgaria joined on 1 January 2026).
A monetary union removes exchange rate risk and conversion costs between members, and removes the exchange rate and an independent interest rate as shock absorbers for each of them, which is what the euro area sovereign debt crisis after 2010 exposed.
The scale today: 384 notified agreements were in force in June 2026, and the share of world imports coming from an agreement partner rose from 37 per cent in 2010 to 52 per cent in 2022. Only about 23 per cent of imports could actually use a preference, because most of the rest was already duty free.
Bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements
An agreement is classified by how many economies sign it, and the difference matters because it decides how many suppliers are left outside the preference.
| Kind | Who signs | Examples | Preferential? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bilateral | Two economies | ChAFTA (Australia and China), A-UKFTA, the Australia–UAE agreement | Yes. One partner is favoured over every other supplier. |
| Regional or plurilateral | A group of economies, in one region or across several | EU, USMCA, ASEAN, RCEP, CPTPP | Yes, but with more members inside the preference. |
| Multilateral | The whole WTO membership | The GATT rounds, the Trade Facilitation Agreement | No. Cuts apply to all members under most favoured nation treatment. |
- Preferential trade agreement
An agreement that gives goods and services from named partners better access than those from everyone else, usually by removing tariffs on them. Most agreements called free trade agreements are preferential in this sense, which is why they can move trade away from more efficient suppliers outside the agreement.
Three facts about the agreements in force now, which a response can use to show the pattern is recent and still growing:
- They keep multiplying. 384 notified agreements were in force on 30 June 2026, and the WTO counted at least 79 more in force that had never been notified to it.
- Most are bilateral free trade areas. In June 2025, 84 per cent were bilateral and 89 per cent were free trade agreements; customs unions made up only 4 per cent.
- Advanced economies hold the most. The EU had 47 agreements in force, the United Kingdom 39 and Australia 19.
WTO Regional Trade Agreements Database, accessed September 2026; WTO RTA factsheet, June 2025.
The shift from regional to cross regional is the recent change. The CPTPP now joins Pacific economies with the United Kingdom, and the EU concluded agreements with Mercosur and with Australia in the first half of 2026, so "regional" describes the older agreements better than the new ones.
The ladder of integration: free trade area to monetary union
Each step keeps everything below it and adds one commitment. The higher the step, the more policy the members give up to the group.
| Step | What members add | Current example | What each member gives up |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free trade area | Remove tariffs and quotas on each other's goods | USMCA: the United States, Mexico and Canada | Very little. Each keeps its own tariffs against outsiders, so rules of origin are needed to stop goods entering through the lowest tariff member. |
| Customs union | A common external tariff against non members | Mercosur: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay | Its own external trade policy. The union negotiates with outsiders as one. |
| Common market | Free movement of labour and capital, not just goods and services | The EU single market, completed in 1993 | Control over migration from other members and over capital flows. |
| Monetary union | One currency and one central bank | The euro area: 21 of the EU's 27 members | Its exchange rate and its own interest rate. |
| Economic union | Coordinated fiscal, competition and welfare policy | The EU in part: common competition law and budget rules, but national tax and welfare systems | Parts of fiscal policy. |
- Common external tariff
The single set of tariffs that every member of a customs union applies to imports from outside it. Because the tariff is the same at every border, a good can move freely once it is inside, and no rule of origin is needed between members.
The EU climbed the whole ladder, and its history is the cleanest illustration. The six founding members signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and the European Economic Community began on 1 January 1958 as a customs union, completing its common external tariff in 1968. The single market in goods, services, labour and capital took effect on 1 January 1993. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 and in force from November 1993, created the European Union and set the path to a shared currency, which arrived in 1999 for eleven members and as notes and coins in 2002. Bulgaria became the 21st member of the euro area on 1 January 2026.
What lifts this to a Band 6
Name the step, not just the bloc. "The EU is a customs union" is true and incomplete; "the EU is a customs union and single market, and 21 of its members also share a currency" tells the marker exactly which commitments are in play, and each one carries a different advantage and cost.
Common mistake
A free trade area and a customs union are the same thing, since both remove tariffs between members.
Why it happens: Both remove internal tariffs, and that is the feature most often described.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Mercosur's members remove tariffs on each other's goods and apply the same tariff to imports from outside the group, but each keeps its own currency and restricts the movement of workers between members.
Which structure does this describe?
Hint 1List what the members do: internal tariffs, external tariffs, labour and capital, currency.
Hint 2A shared external tariff is the feature that separates two of the options.
Hint 3Free movement of labour is the step above it, and it is missing here.
What a preferential agreement does: creation against diversion
Start from an economy that taxes imports from everyone at the same rate, buys from the cheapest supplier in the world and pays the tariff on top. It then signs an agreement with one partner, whose goods now enter untaxed.
- Domestic demand
- Domestic supply
- Created by cheaper production
- Created by higher consumption
- Diverted from the cheapest supplier
- Domestic price before the agreement
- $10.00
- Domestic price after it
- $8.00
- Where imports come from
- The partner, at its higher cost
- Trade created
- 16.0
- Trade diverted
- 16.0
- Net effect on welfare
- Gain of 0.0
- What decides the sign
- How close the partner is to being the cheapest supplier, and how high the tariff was. A large partner with costs near the world level creates more than it diverts. A small partner with high costs, chosen for political reasons, does the reverse, and the revenue the government loses becomes the partner’s income rather than the consumer’s saving.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
- Trade creation
Higher trade volume created by the lower price: expensive domestic production gives way to cheaper imports, and consumers buy more. A gain in efficiency, shown by the two triangles.
- Trade diversion
Trade shifted from the cheapest supplier in the world to the agreement partner because only the partner's goods avoid the tariff. The economy now pays a higher real cost for the same imports, and the government's tariff revenue becomes the partner's income. Shown by the rectangle.
Chain of reasoning
Why the sign of the net effect is not obvious
- The agreement removes the tariff for one partner only, so the partner's price falls below the taxed world price.
- The domestic price falls to the partner's price, which creates trade: domestic output contracts, consumption rises.
- Imports switch to the partner even though the partner's real cost is higher than the cheapest world supplier's, which diverts trade.
- The government stops collecting the tariff. Part of that revenue reaches consumers as a lower price, and part becomes income for the partner's producers.
- Whether the economy gains depends on the size of the creation triangles against the diversion rectangle, so a preferential agreement with the wrong partner can lower welfare.
Worked example5 marks
Does the agreement raise welfare?
An economy applies a tariff of $4 on imports of a good. The cheapest world supplier sells at $6, and a neighbouring economy sells at $8. The economy imports 40 units before the agreement and 56 units after signing a free trade agreement with the neighbour. The creation gain is estimated at $60. Determine the net welfare effect.
Find the price before and after
Before the agreement the cheapest source is the world supplier at $6, plus the $4 tariff, so the domestic price is $10. After it, the neighbour's goods enter untaxed at $8, which is below $10, so the domestic price falls to $8 and imports switch to the neighbour.
Value the diversion
The volume that used to come from the cheapest source now costs more in real resources.
The 40 units imported before now come from a supplier whose cost is $8 rather than $6, so the economy pays $2 more per unit in real resources:
That $80 was tariff revenue collected by the government before the agreement, and it is now income for the neighbour's producers.
Net the two effects
Creation is $60 and diversion is $80, so the net effect is a loss of $20. The agreement lowers welfare even though the domestic price fell and trade volume rose.
Answer
A net welfare loss of $20. The agreement is trade diverting on balance, because the partner is well above the world's cheapest supplier and the tariff was high enough to make the preference decisive.
Is that answer sensible?
Falling prices and rising import volumes are consistent with a welfare loss here, which is the point of the example. If the partner had been the cheapest supplier in the world, diversion would have been zero and the agreement would have been an unambiguous gain.
Common mistake
A free trade agreement must improve welfare, because it removes a tariff.
Why it happens: Removing a tariff raises welfare in the model of free trade taught in the lesson on the basis of free trade, so the conclusion is carried across.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
A student writes: "Any free trade agreement must make an economy better off, because removing a tariff always raises welfare."
What is wrong with this reasoning?
Hint 1The welfare result from the gains from trade diagram assumes the tariff is removed against everybody.
Hint 2An agreement removes it for one partner only. What does that do to where imports come from?
Hint 3The partner is the cheapest supplier whose goods avoid the tariff, which is not the same as the cheapest supplier.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
An economy applies a tariff of 5 units of currency on all imports of a good. The cheapest world supplier produces at 20 and a neighbouring economy produces at 23. Before signing a free trade agreement with the neighbour, the economy imported 300 units of the good.
Calculate the value of the trade diverted by the agreement, in units of currency.
Hint 1Work out the domestic price before the agreement, and then which supplier the economy buys from afterwards.
Hint 2Diversion is valued on the volume that was already being imported, at the difference in real production cost.
Hint 3300 multiplied by the gap between 23 and 20.
How much world trade actually moves under a preference
The number of agreements says little on its own. What matters is how much trade they touch, and a WTO study that matched every agreement against actual import flows gives the answer.
- Imports from agreement partners
- Imports that could use a preference
The numbers behind this graph
| Year | Imports from partners, % | Could use a preference, % |
|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 37 | 16.9 |
| 2011 | 38 | |
| 2012 | 39 | |
| 2013 | 40 | |
| 2014 | 42 | |
| 2015 | 44 | 20.3 |
| 2016 | 45 | |
| 2017 | 45 | |
| 2018 | 46 | |
| 2019 | 48 | |
| 2020 | 51 | |
| 2021 | 50 | |
| 2022 | 52 | 23.3 |
- Imports from partners, 2022
- 52 per cent of world imports
- Could use a preference
- 23.3 per cent of world imports
- Change since 2010
- Imports from partners up 15 points; imports that could use a preference up 6.4 points
- Agreements in force
- 224 in 2010, 290 in 2015 and 385 in 2022. On the WTO's own count, 384 notified agreements were in force at 30 June 2026, with at least 79 more not yet notified.
- Why the gap
- An agreement can only give a preference on a good that carries a tariff. Over half of world imports already enter duty free for every supplier, and that share rose as ordinary tariffs were cut, so a new agreement often covers trade that was never taxed.
- Australia
- The share of Australia's imports that came from agreement partners rose from 36 per cent in 2010 to 74 per cent in 2022, as agreements with Korea, Japan and China came into force from 2014 and RCEP in 2022.
- Source
- World Trade Organization, Acharya and Parajuli, The Evolution of Preferential Trade Under Regional Trade Agreements: Has Anything Changed?, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2025-03, 10 February 2025, data to 2022
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Two findings, and the second is the one most accounts miss.
- More trade is now between partners. The share of world merchandise imports coming from an economy the importer had an agreement with rose from 37 per cent in 2010 to 52 per cent in 2022, as the number of agreements in force rose from 224 to 385. For Australia the change was sharper: 36 per cent of its imports came from partners in 2010 and 74 per cent in 2022, mostly because the agreements with China, Japan and Korea took effect in between.
- Much less trade can use a preference. In 2022, 55 per cent of world imports already entered duty free at the ordinary most favoured nation rate, and a further 22 per cent paid the ordinary tariff because no agreement covered them. Only 23 per cent could claim a preferential rate at all, up from 17 per cent in 2010.
WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2025-03, Acharya and Parajuli, February 2025.
The gap between the two figures is the useful point. An agreement with a partner does not create a preference on goods that were already duty free, so the rise to 52 per cent overstates how much of world trade is shaped by discrimination. It also means the potential for trade diversion is smaller than the count of agreements implies.
- Rules of origin
The criteria that decide whether a good counts as coming from a partner and so qualifies for the preferential tariff, usually a threshold of local content or a change in tariff classification. They exist to stop goods being routed through the lowest tariff member of a free trade area, and they are an administrative cost that can be large enough for firms to pay the ordinary tariff instead.
That cost is why a preference that exists is not always used. A small exporter shipping a good assembled from parts made in several economies must prove origin under each agreement's own rules, and where the preferential margin is only a few per cent, paying the ordinary tariff can be cheaper than the paperwork. The North American case in the next lesson shows the reverse: when the United States imposed tariffs in 2025 that exempted goods meeting the USMCA rules, firms suddenly found compliance worth the cost.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Why does every preferential trade agreement need rules of origin?
Hint 1The preference applies to goods from the partner, not to goods that merely arrive from the partner.
Hint 2Think about what an exporter outside the agreement would otherwise do.
Hint 3The rules stop one thing, and their cost is the reason many firms do not use the preference at all.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
A WTO study found that the share of world merchandise imports coming from an economy the importer had a trade agreement with rose from 37 per cent in 2010 to 52 per cent in 2022. Over the same period, the share of world imports that could actually claim a preferential tariff rose from about 17 per cent to about 23 per cent, and the share entering duty free at the ordinary most favoured nation rate was about 55 per cent in 2022.
Explain why the second figure is so much smaller than the first, and what this implies about the scope for trade diversion. (4 marks)
Hint 1A preference only exists where the partner would otherwise pay a tariff.
Hint 2What happens to a good that already enters duty free when an agreement is signed?
Hint 3Diversion needs a preference to divert trade with.
Monetary union: what a shared currency gives and takes
- Monetary union
A group of economies that share one currency and one central bank, so there is a single monetary policy and no exchange rate between members. In practice it sits on top of a common market, as in the euro area, whose 21 members share the euro and whose interest rate is set by the European Central Bank.
What members gain.
- No conversion costs on trade and travel between members, and prices that can be compared directly across borders, which sharpens competition.
- No exchange rate risk between members, which matters most for investment: a firm building a plant to supply the rest of the union no longer faces a currency that might move against it.
- Credibility borrowed from the union's central bank. Members with a history of high inflation gained lower interest rates on joining, because the rate was set for the whole union.
What members give up. A member loses two shock absorbers at once, which is the disadvantage the syllabus expects to see explained rather than named.
Chain of reasoning
Why a monetary union amplifies an asymmetric shock
- A shock hits one member harder than the others, so its output falls relative to theirs.
- It cannot depreciate, because it has no currency of its own, so competitiveness cannot be restored through the exchange rate.
- It cannot cut its policy rate, because the central bank sets one rate for the whole union, and that rate answers to the union average rather than to the worst affected member.
- Adjustment therefore falls on wages and prices, which move slowly, so it arrives as prolonged unemployment instead.
- Unless the union has large fiscal transfers between members, which the euro area does not, the whole burden of adjustment sits on the member that was hit.
That chain is the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 to 2012 in outline. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain could not devalue and faced a single policy rate set for a union whose largest members were recovering, so they adjusted through deep contractions. Doubts about one member's debt spread to others through the banks that held it, which is the contagion the crisis is remembered for. The European Central Bank's pledge in July 2012 to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro, backed by a bond purchase programme, is what ended the acute phase, and it showed that a monetary union needs a lender able to stand behind every member's bonds.
The union has kept growing regardless. Croatia adopted the euro in 2023 and Bulgaria in January 2026, which is evidence that economies outside still judge the gains to exceed the lost independence. Denmark, which has the right to stay out, pegs its krone to the euro instead: it takes the exchange rate stability without the shared central bank, and gives up an independent interest rate anyway.
Common mistake
Brexit was the United Kingdom leaving the euro.
Why it happens: Brexit and the euro crisis happened in the same decade and are both taught as costs of European integration.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Explain the advantages and disadvantages of membership of a monetary union, with reference to the euro area. (5 marks)
Hint 1Start with what a monetary union is: a common market plus one currency and one central bank.
Hint 2The advantages are about the cost of doing business across a large market. The disadvantages are about what a member gives up when a shock hits it alone.
Hint 3The euro area after 2010 is the evidence. Name the absorbers the affected economies did not have.
Trading blocs, intra-regional trade and intra-industry trade
- Trading bloc
A group of economies in a formal preferential agreement that trade freely with each other and discriminate against non members. The term is used most precisely for customs unions and above, where members share a common external tariff, and loosely for any regional agreement.
Blocs have two consequences for where trade goes.
Intra-regional trade is trade between members of the same bloc. It is highest in the EU: 61.0 per cent of member states' goods exports in 2025 went to other members, from 28 per cent for Cyprus to 83 per cent for Luxembourg. In ASEAN it is far lower and falling, from 25.1 per cent of members' trade in 2010 to 22.5 per cent in 2024, because its members sell more to China, the United States and the rest of the world than to each other.
Eurostat, intra and extra EU trade by member state (ext_lt_intratrd), 2026; ASEAN Secretariat, ASEANstats, via the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.
The contrast is worth a sentence in any response: a deep bloc of economies with similar incomes and integrated markets trades mostly with itself, while a free trade area of economies at very different stages of development, sitting inside Asian supply chains that end in China and the United States, does not.
Intra-industry trade is two way trade in similar goods, such as Germany and France each exporting cars to the other. It grows inside blocs because economies with similar incomes and tastes specialise in varieties and in stages of production rather than in whole industries. Transnational corporations drive much of it: a firm that spreads production across a bloc ships components across internal borders several times before a finished good leaves, and the absence of tariffs and customs checks inside the bloc is what makes that viable.
Chain of reasoning
How a bloc acts as an external economy of scale
- Members remove tariffs and, in a common market, harmonise standards and customs procedures.
- Firms can supply the whole bloc from one plant, so the market they plan for is the bloc rather than one economy.
- Larger output lowers average cost, and suppliers, skilled labour and transport links cluster around the plants.
- Lower costs attract further investment, including from transnational corporations outside the bloc, which build inside it to avoid the external tariff.
- The same process raises the cost of being outside, which is the risk: the world can fragment into self-contained blocs that trade less with each other.
What lifts this to a Band 6
The last link is the evaluation. A bloc raises welfare when it creates more trade than it diverts, and when its external tariff is low enough that outsiders are not shut out. A response that ends on the scale gains alone has described a bloc; one that weighs them against fragmentation has evaluated it.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
In 2025, 61 per cent of EU member states' goods exports went to other EU members. In 2024, 22.5 per cent of ASEAN members' trade was with other ASEAN members, down from 25.1 per cent in 2010.
Explain why intra-regional trade is so much higher in the EU than in ASEAN. (4 marks)
Hint 1Compare how deep the two agreements are: which step of the ladder each has reached.
Hint 2Compare the members: their incomes and what they produce.
Hint 3Where do ASEAN members' exports end up?
When is a preferential agreement most likely to raise welfare?
Four conditions, which are worth holding as a checklist because they generate an evaluation for any agreement in the exam.
- The partner is a low cost producer. Diversion is small when the partner is close to being the cheapest supplier in the world, and large when the partner was chosen for political reasons.
- The tariff being removed was low. A high tariff makes the preference decisive, so more trade is diverted.
- The members' economies compete rather than complement. If members produce similar goods, the agreement reallocates production towards the more efficient producers inside the bloc, which is creation. If each member is the only producer of its good, there is nothing to reallocate.
- The bloc is large and its external tariff is low. A large membership leaves fewer cheap suppliers outside, and a low external tariff limits the distortion against those that remain.
The euro area adds a fifth condition of its own, from the theory of optimum currency areas: a shared currency works when members' cycles move together, when labour moves between them, and when fiscal transfers cushion a member that is hit alone. The euro area met the first condition partly and the others hardly at all, which is why the crisis after 2010 took the form it did.
Are agreements the reason trade grew, or the record of it?
Worth being careful here. Tariffs fell across the world before most current agreements were signed, through the GATT rounds and through unilateral reductions taken for domestic reasons, including Australia's own from 1988. Much of the growth in trade over the last four decades is explained by falling transport and communication costs and by the fragmentation of production into supply chains, none of which any agreement caused.
The WTO figures above support that reading. By 2022 more than half of world imports already crossed borders duty free at the ordinary rate, so for most trade there was no tariff left for an agreement to remove. What agreements did was lock in reductions and make them credible, which matters for investment: a firm building an export plant needs the market access to still exist in ten years. They have also gone well beyond tariffs, into services, investment, digital trade and standards, where the WTO has made little progress.
So the honest formulation is that agreements secured and extended a liberalisation that was mostly driven by other forces, and that they mattered most where they bound a reversal that would otherwise have been easy. The 2025 US tariffs are the test case: goods meeting the USMCA's rules were exempted, so the agreement protected exactly the trade it bound.
Putting it together
Through a marker’s eyes
4 marks
Explain the difference between trade creation and trade diversion.
The attempt
1 out of 4
Trade creation is when a free trade agreement creates more trade between the countries in the agreement. Trade diversion is when trade is diverted away from countries that are not in the agreement. Trade creation is good for the economy and trade diversion is bad. Most free trade agreements cause both of these things to happen at the same time.
What the marker sees
One mark. Both terms are defined by repeating the word in them, which tells the marker nothing about the mechanism. There is no price, no tariff, no mention of the cheapest supplier and no explanation of why one raises welfare and the other lowers it. The last sentence is correct and unsupported. Four marks needs the price change that causes creation, the switch in source that causes diversion, and why the switch is costly.
The same answer, fixed
4 out of 4
Both effects follow from the same change: an agreement removes the tariff for one partner but leaves it in place for everyone else, so the partner's goods become the cheapest available in the domestic market.
Trade creation is the gain that comes from the lower domestic price. Production that was viable only behind the tariff contracts, and consumers buy more at the lower price, so consumption shifts from expensive domestic output to cheaper imports. Resources are reallocated towards their lower opportunity cost use, which is the ordinary gain from trade.
Trade diversion is the loss that comes from the change in source. The partner may not be the cheapest producer in the world; it is only the cheapest one whose goods avoid the tariff. Imports that previously came from the most efficient supplier now come from the partner at a higher real cost, and the tariff revenue the government collected on them becomes income for the partner's producers instead.
The net effect is therefore ambiguous. An agreement raises welfare when the creation triangles exceed the diversion, which happens when the partner is close to being the cheapest supplier and the tariff removed was low, and lowers welfare when a high tariff is removed for a high cost partner chosen for political reasons.