The International Business Cycle and Development
The third of the three components the syllabus lists under the effects of globalisation: how a downturn that begins somewhere else reaches a developing economy, which channels carry it, and why the same cycle costs a poor economy far more than a rich one.
75 min · HSC Topic One - The Global Economy
Assumes you have read The Effects of Globalisation and The International and Regional Business Cycles.
The full teaching. Start here.
- International business cycle
The tendency of national business cycles to move together, because trade, investment, finance and confidence link economies to each other. The more open an economy is, the more of its cycle is imported.
- Commodity dependence
An economy earning more than 60 per cent of its merchandise export income from commodities. It is the normal condition of a developing economy: 95 of 195 economies are commodity dependent, and 45 of the 54 economies in Africa.
- Sudden stop
A rapid reversal of capital inflow into an economy, usually triggered by a change in world conditions rather than by anything the economy did. The currency falls, the cost of servicing foreign currency debt rises, and the government is forced into contraction at the worst moment.
- Decoupling
The claim that emerging and developing economies can keep growing while the advanced economies slow. Partial decoupling has occurred, because China and India are now large enough to be a second source of demand, and no economy has decoupled from world financial conditions.
The five things worth carrying out of this lesson:
- Integration imports the cycle. The gain from trade and foreign capital is a faster trend rate of growth. The cost is that the economy now moves with a cycle set elsewhere, and neither the gain nor the cost is optional once the economy is open.
- Three channels do most of the work for a developing economy. The price of what it exports, the willingness of foreign capital to stay, and the money sent home by its workers abroad. Trade volumes and confidence matter too, and these three are where the marks are.
- The same downturn costs a poor economy more. Not because the shock is larger, but because the buffers are smaller: no fiscal space, thin reserves, debt owed in someone else's currency, and no welfare system to catch the people who lose their income.
- Volatility damages development, not just output. A government whose revenue halves without warning cancels the schools, clinics and transmission lines that would have diversified the economy out of the exposure. The cycle attacks the cure.
- Not all foreign money behaves alike. Portfolio investment reverses in an afternoon, direct investment falls with expected profits, and remittances hold up or rise, because the sender is responding to a family's need rather than to a return.
Why the cycle is a development problem and not only a growth problem
Start with what integration buys. An economy that opens to trade and foreign capital raises its trend growth rate, because it can specialise, import capital that is scarce at home, and buy technology it could not have developed. Every economy that has escaped poverty quickly in the last fifty years did it this way.
The bill arrives in a different currency. Once an economy sells into world markets and borrows from world lenders, its output moves with world demand and world financial conditions, and the more open it is the more of its cycle is imported. Openness, measured as exports plus imports as a share of GDP, is close to a measure of exposure.
Chain of reasoning
From an advanced economy downturn to a delayed development plan
Demand falls in the advanced economies, so they buy fewer manufactured goods and less of the commodities used to make them.
The world price of the developing economy's main export falls, and its export earnings fall with it, whatever its own output does.
Because export royalties and resource taxes are a large share of government revenue, and there is little other tax base, the budget contracts at the same time.
Foreign capital, which is funding the current account deficit, sees falling revenue and rising risk, and leaves. The currency falls, which raises the cost of servicing debt owed in dollars.
The government cuts spending because it must. The projects cut first are the long ones with no immediate constituency: schooling, clinics, roads, electricity transmission.
Those were the projects that would have diversified the economy away from the single export, so the next cycle arrives with the same exposure and often with more debt.
That last link is the whole dot point. For an advanced economy a downturn is a loss of output that is later recovered. For a developing economy it is a loss of the capacity to build the things that would have ended the exposure, and that loss is permanent.
Common mistake
Treating the exposure as evidence that developing economies should not open up
Why it happens:
The economies with the least exposure to the world cycle are the ones with almost no trade, and they are not the ones developing fastest. The examinable argument is about managing the exposure, with reserves, diversification, flexible exchange rates and debt in the right currency, rather than about avoiding it.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Two economies suffer the same fall in world demand for their exports. Why does the downturn typically cost the developing economy more?
Hint 1The shock is the same size in both economies, so the answer is about what happens next.
Hint 2What does an advanced economy do in a downturn that a developing economy often cannot?
Hint 3Think about borrowing capacity, reserves, the currency the debt is in, and automatic stabilisers.
Channel one: the price of what the economy sells
A commodity exporter does not need a domestic recession to have one. The world price of its export is set in a market it cannot influence, and when the world slows, that price falls. Because commodities have low price elasticity of demand in the short run, a small change in world demand produces a large change in price, so the swing arriving at the exporter is amplified rather than damped.
- Export earnings of the commodity exporter
- What the government can afford to spend
- An economy whose exports are diversified
The numbers behind this graph
| Brent crude | US$ a barrel |
|---|---|
| 2019 average | 64 |
| April 2020 | 18 |
| June 2022 | 123 |
| 2024 average | 80 |
- On these settings
- A 45 per cent fall in the price of a commodity that is 75 per cent of exports moves export earnings by -34 per cent, and government spending by -33 per cent once the fund has absorbed what it can.
- Why the budget moves with the price
- Export royalties, resource taxes and the company tax paid by the exporting firms are a large share of revenue in a commodity dependent economy, and there is little else to tax because incomes are low and much of the economy is informal. So the price of one commodity sets both the foreign exchange the economy earns and the money the government has, and a downturn arrives twice.
- What the swing looks like in practice
- Brent crude averaged US$64 a barrel in 2019, about US$18 in April 2020 and about US$123 in June 2022, before settling near US$80 in 2024. An exporter had to run a budget, an exchange rate and a development plan across that range in four years.
- How common this is
- 95 of 195 economies earn more than 60 per cent of their merchandise export income from commodities, including 45 of 54 in Africa. This is the normal condition of a developing economy rather than an unlucky special case.
- What the fund does and does not do
- A stabilisation fund saves the windfall of a boom and spends it in the slump, which flattens the spending path without changing the earnings path. It requires a boom to be saved first, which is politically hard where the spending is needed immediately, and it does nothing about the long run problem, which is that the economy sells one thing.
- The real damage is to development
- Volatile revenue makes long projects unfinanceable. Schools, clinics, transmission lines and ports need a decade of committed spending, and a government whose revenue halves without warning cancels or delays them, so the capital that would diversify the economy out of the problem is the first thing the problem destroys.
- Read it as
- A model with an index, not a forecast for any economy. The price figures are real. The transmission, the lag between earnings and spending, and the difference the diversified comparison makes are the examinable content.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Three consequences follow, and they are worth separating in an answer.
| Consequence | Mechanism | Why it hurts more in a developing economy |
|---|---|---|
| Export earnings fall | Price times quantity, and the quantity cannot rise fast enough to compensate | The foreign currency earned is what pays for imported fuel, medicine, machinery and food |
| Government revenue falls | Royalties, resource taxes and company tax from exporters are a large share of a narrow tax base | There is no broad income tax to fall back on, because incomes are low and much of the workforce is informal |
| The currency falls | Fewer export dollars are being converted into local currency | Imported goods become dearer, so inflation rises while output falls |
The last row is the one most answers miss. In an advanced economy a depreciation is a stabiliser, because it makes exports competitive. In a commodity exporter it does far less, because the quantity of ore or oil sold is set by contracts and capacity rather than by price competitiveness, and it imports inflation at the same time.
What lifts this to a Band 6
Say "terms of trade" and use it precisely. The terms of trade is export prices divided by import prices, and a commodity price fall is a fall in the terms of trade, which reduces real income independently of how much the economy produces. That is the single most efficient sentence available on this channel.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
An economy earns US$30 billion from merchandise exports, of which 80 per cent is one commodity. A world downturn cuts that commodity's price by 35 per cent while the volume exported is unchanged, and the rest of its exports are unaffected. By what percentage do total export earnings fall? Give your answer to one decimal place.
Hint 1Only part of the export bundle moves with the price.
Hint 2Work out the earnings of the exposed part first.
Hint 3Express the fall against total earnings, not against the exposed part.
Channel two: whether foreign capital stays
The second channel is faster than the first and less forgiving. Foreign capital flows into developing economies when the return there is attractive relative to a safe advanced economy asset. Notice that the second half of that sentence is not about the developing economy at all.
- Fall in the currency, per cent
- Rise in the cost of servicing debt, per cent of government revenue
- Change in net capital inflow, per cent of GDP
- On these settings
- A rise of 5.25 percentage points takes about 8.1 per cent of GDP out in net capital flows, moves the currency down about 19 per cent, and adds about 4.4 per cent of government revenue to the cost of servicing debt.
- Why capital leaves
- Investors hold developing economy assets because they pay more than an advanced economy bond. When the advanced economy bond starts paying five per cent, the extra return no longer compensates for the extra risk, so the money goes home. Nothing about the developing economy needs to have deteriorated, which is what makes this an imported shock rather than a domestic failure.
- Why the currency makes it worse
- Debt borrowed in United States dollars has to be repaid in United States dollars, and is earned in the local currency. A depreciation therefore raises the real burden of the debt at exactly the moment the economy can least afford it, which is why the foreign currency share matters so much. On these settings 55 per cent of the debt is owed in a currency the government cannot print.
- What reserves do
- Foreign exchange reserves let a central bank meet the outflow without letting the currency collapse, which is why reserve cover is quoted in months of imports. 4 months of cover flattens the depreciation curve here, and it does not remove the outflow, because reserves are finite and the market knows how large they are.
- The recent case
- Between March 2022 and July 2023 the United States federal funds rate rose by 5.25 percentage points, the fastest tightening in forty years, and the dollar rose with it. Sri Lanka defaulted in May 2022, Ghana in December 2022, and a long list of low income economies moved into debt distress without any domestic shock. The IMF programmes that follow arrive with conditions, which is where this lesson meets the international organisations material.
- What the government can do about it
- Very little in the moment, and a good deal beforehand. Borrowing in its own currency where it can, lengthening maturities so that less debt has to be refinanced in any one year, building reserves during good years, and keeping a floating exchange rate so the adjustment happens in the currency rather than in output, all reduce the damage. All of them cost something while the world is calm.
- Read it as
- A model of directions and rough magnitudes, not a measurement. The 5.25 percentage point rise and the defaults that followed are real. The curves are drawn to show which lever changes which effect.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Economists call this the difference between pull factors, which are conditions inside the receiving economy, and push factors, which are conditions outside it. A sudden stop driven by push factors is the purest form of imported shock available: the economy has done nothing, and the capital leaves because a central bank in another hemisphere raised its policy rate.
Between March 2022 and July 2023 the United States federal funds rate rose by 5.25 percentage points, the fastest tightening in forty years. What followed in the developing world was not a story about those economies' own policies.
| What happened | Why it followed | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Capital returned to advanced economy bonds | A safe asset now paid what a risky one used to | Currencies fell across emerging and frontier markets |
| The United States dollar rose | Capital moving into dollar assets bids up the dollar | Debt owed in dollars became dearer to service, measured in local currency |
| Debt servicing crowded out spending | The same revenue had to cover a larger interest bill | Health and education budgets were cut in economies already behind |
| Several economies defaulted | Refinancing became impossible at the new rates | Sri Lanka in May 2022, Ghana in December 2022, with a long list in distress |
The asymmetry between currencies is the part worth understanding properly. A government that borrows in its own currency can always meet the payment, because it issues that currency; the cost of doing so is inflation, not default. A government that borrows in dollars must earn or buy dollars, and a depreciation raises that burden exactly when export earnings are falling. This is why the currency composition of debt, not just its size, decides how a downturn ends.
Common mistake
Explaining a debt crisis in a developing economy as the result of irresponsible borrowing
Why it happens:
Borrowing that is prudent at two per cent is ruinous at seven, and the borrower did not set either rate. The mark is in saying that the shock was external and then assessing what the government could have done to be less exposed to it: borrowing at longer maturities, in its own currency where markets allow, and holding reserves built during the boom.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
A response explains the 2022 wave of developing economy debt distress as the result of governments borrowing irresponsibly. What is the strongest correction?
Hint 1Ask what changed between the year the debt was issued and the year it became a crisis.
Hint 2Was the change inside those economies or outside them?
Hint 3Two prices moved: the interest rate and the dollar.
Channel three: the money that does not leave
Not every source of foreign money behaves like capital, and the difference is examinable.
- Portfolio investment
- Direct investment
- Official development assistance
- Remittances sent home by migrant workers
The numbers behind this graph
| Year | Remittances to low and middle income economies (US$bn) |
|---|---|
| 2019 | 548 |
| 2020 | 540 |
| 2021 | 605 |
| 2022 | 647 |
| 2023 | 656 |
| 2024 | 685 |
- On these settings
- A downturn of 4.5 per cent moves portfolio investment by about -50 per cent, direct investment by about -14 per cent and remittances by about -1.6 per cent.
- Why portfolio money goes first
- Portfolio investment is a holding of shares or bonds that can be sold on a screen, so it reverses at the speed of a decision. Direct investment is a factory, a mine or a stake in a firm, which cannot be withdrawn quickly and usually is not, so it falls with expected profits rather than with sentiment. That difference in reversibility is the whole reason the two are taught apart.
- Why remittances hold up
- Remittances are not an investment and do not chase a return. A worker abroad sends money to a family, and sends more when that family is in trouble, so the flow is countercyclical for the receiving economy even while it is under pressure in the sending one. Flows to low and middle income economies were US$548 billion in 2019 and US$540 billion in 2020, a fall of about 1.5 per cent, against forecasts of a collapse, and reached about US$685 billion in 2024.
- Where the exposure slider bites
- Migrants are concentrated in construction, hospitality, transport and care work. A downturn that closes those sectors, rather than one that only lowers asset prices, does reach remittances, which is why the 2020 outcome depended on which economies the migrants were working in and how much support those economies gave their workforces.
- Why the mix matters for development
- Remittances arrive as income for households and are spent on food, schooling and housing, so they reduce poverty directly and are the most reliable foreign currency many economies receive. Direct investment builds capacity. Portfolio investment funds a deficit cheaply and then leaves. An economy financed mostly by the third is one cycle away from a crisis.
- Read it as
- A model of how each channel responds, with the direction and the ordering as the examinable content. The remittance figures are real; the curves are not a forecast of any particular downturn.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
Remittances are transfers from people working abroad to families at home. They are not an investment, so they do not respond to interest rate differentials, and the sender's motive is the opposite of procyclical: when the family at home is in trouble, the transfer rises. In 2020 the World Bank forecast a fall of about 20 per cent in remittances to low and middle income economies. The outturn was a fall of about 1.6 per cent, from about US$548 billion to about US$540 billion, and the flow then rose every year to about US$685 billion in 2024.
That makes remittances the largest and steadiest source of external finance many developing economies have, larger than foreign direct investment into those economies and several times official development assistance. They also arrive as household income rather than as a project, so they reduce poverty directly, are spent on food, schooling and housing, and do not add to debt.
The qualifications belong in the same paragraph, because an unqualified claim reads as advocacy.
- They depend on migration being possible, so border closures, visa rules and hostility in host economies are a risk that has nothing to do with economics at home.
- Transfer fees are high, averaging well above the six per cent target set in the Sustainable Development Goals, so a share of the flow is lost in the sending.
- They finance consumption more than investment, which sustains households without necessarily building productive capacity.
- They can raise the exchange rate and reduce the competitiveness of the economy's own exports, which is the same mechanism as the resource curse operating through a different inflow.
Common mistake
Listing foreign investment, aid and remittances together as 'foreign money coming in'
Why it happens:
Portfolio investment can be sold on a screen and leaves first. Direct investment is a factory and leaves slowly if at all. Aid depends on donor budgets, which are cut in a downturn. Remittances depend on a worker's wage and a family's need, and hold up. An economy financed mostly by the first is one cycle away from a crisis, and saying so is worth more than naming the four flows.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Explain why sources of foreign finance behave differently in a world downturn, and why the difference matters for a developing economy.
Hint 1Rank the flows by how quickly they can reverse.
Hint 2Remittances have a different motive from the others. Say what it is.
Hint 3Finish on what the mix means for stability and for development.
Has the cycle become one cycle?
Globalisation has made national cycles move together, because the channels that carry a shock are the same channels that carry the trade and investment. Two questions follow, and both are set in exams.
Can developing economies decouple? Partly, and less than the word suggests. The rise of China and India created a second source of world demand, so an economy exporting to Asia is no longer wholly exposed to a downturn in the United States and Europe, and in the 2008 crisis emerging economies recovered faster than the advanced economies that caused it. But the decoupling is in the real channel only. Financial conditions are set by the advanced economy central banks, dollar funding markets are global, and no developing economy has decoupled from those. And an economy that has substituted exposure to the United States for exposure to China has diversified its customers, not removed its exposure to a cycle.
Does integration make output more volatile? Trade integration tends to synchronise cycles. Financial integration can do either: it allows an economy to borrow through a bad year and smooth consumption, which is stabilising, and it allows capital to leave in a rush, which is not. The evidence is that financial openness stabilises economies with deep institutions and destabilises those without, which is why the sequencing of financial liberalisation is a live policy argument rather than a settled one.
The policy response has the same shape at every scale.
| Response | What it does | Its limit |
|---|---|---|
| Foreign exchange reserves | Meet an outflow without a collapse in the currency | Expensive to hold, and finite in a way the market can calculate |
| Floating exchange rate | Lets the adjustment happen in the currency rather than in output and employment | Imports inflation, and is painful where debt is in foreign currency |
| Stabilisation or sovereign wealth funds | Save a boom and spend it in the slump, smoothing government spending | Requires saving during a boom, when the spending is most needed and most popular |
| Diversifying exports | Reduces the exposure itself rather than managing it | Takes a decade of investment, which the cycle keeps interrupting |
| Policy coordination through the G20 and the IMF | Avoids each economy contracting at once and deepening the downturn | Voluntary, and it happens reliably only in a crisis |
What lifts this to a Band 6
The coordination row is where the strongest answers separate. In 2009 the G20 coordinated fiscal expansion and the recovery was shared. In 2020 the response was national and unequal: advanced economies spent on a scale developing economies could not match, because they could borrow in their own currencies at near zero rates, so the same shock produced a recovery in one group and lost years in the other. That contrast is a complete evaluation paragraph on its own.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Discuss the claim that developing economies have decoupled from the business cycle of the advanced economies.
Hint 1Split the claim into the real channel and the financial channel.
Hint 2What changed to make partial decoupling possible?
Hint 3Substituting one customer for another is not the same as removing exposure.
COVID as the clearest case available
The pandemic is the most useful single episode for this dot point, because it hit every economy at once and the outcomes still diverged.
World output fell about 2.8 per cent in 2020 and rebounded about 6.3 per cent in 2021, which looks like a shared shock and a shared recovery. Underneath that, advanced economies supported household incomes with fiscal packages worth a large share of GDP, financed by borrowing in their own currencies at interest rates close to zero. Most developing economies could do neither: borrowing in a foreign currency at a risk premium, with revenue collapsing and reserves thin, the support they could offer was a fraction of the need. Tourism dependent economies lost their entire export sector at once. Children out of school for a year in an economy with no capacity for remote teaching lost human capital that has not been recovered.
The word for that permanent loss is scarring: the part of a downturn that does not come back when demand does. Scarring is larger where firms fail rather than pause, where workers lose skills rather than hours, and where public investment is cancelled rather than delayed. All three are more likely where there was no fiscal space, which is why the same shock produced an interruption in one group of economies and a lost half decade in the other.
Then the sequel. The inflation that followed the recovery brought the fastest tightening in forty years, and that arrived in the developing world as a capital reversal, a stronger dollar and a wave of debt distress. One shock, two mechanisms, five years, and the development consequences run through both.
Why volatility itself lowers growth
There is a standard argument worth having in an extended response. Volatility is not only unpleasant, it lowers the average rate of growth, for three reasons.
Investment requires a return that compensates for risk, so where revenue and the exchange rate swing widely, the required return is higher and fewer projects clear it. Volatile revenue makes long lived public investment unfinanceable, and long lived public investment is exactly what changes an economy's structure. And households facing uncertain income hold savings in safe, liquid, low return forms rather than in productive ones, which is rational for them and a loss of investment for the economy.
So exposure to the world cycle does not average out over time. A sequence of booms and busts with the same mean as a steady path produces less development than the steady path, which is the economic justification for stabilisation funds, reserve accumulation and countercyclical policy in developing economies rather than a moral one.
Where this sits
This completes the three components of the effects of globalisation. Trade, investment and transnational corporations decide what an economy produces and keeps; environmental sustainability decides what the production costs beyond the price; the business cycle decides how reliably any of it can be planned.
For essays, this material carries the stability half of priority 12, the globalisation essay, whose plan is in the international and regional business cycles lesson. It also supplies the shock and response paragraphs of priority 8, the case study, where an economy other than Australia has to be shown responding to a downturn it did not cause. For Topic 2, the same channels reappear as Australia's exposure to world conditions, with the important difference that Australia borrows in its own currency, floats, and holds a flexible fiscal position, which is the contrast that makes the developing economy case legible.
Putting it together
Worked example4 marks
Tracing one price fall through to the budget
A developing economy earns 70 per cent of its merchandise export income from one commodity. Its export earnings in the year before a world downturn are US$20 billion. The world price of that commodity falls 40 per cent, and the volume exported is unchanged. Resource taxes and royalties from the commodity provide 45 per cent of government revenue, which was US$8 billion.
Calculate the fall in export earnings and the fall in government revenue, and state one development consequence.
Find the share of earnings exposed to the price
Only the commodity's earnings move with its price. That is 70 per cent of US$20 billion, which is US$14 billion. The remaining US$6 billion is unaffected in this question.
Apply the price fall to the exposed share
A 40 per cent fall in price with unchanged volume reduces those earnings by 0.40 times US$14 billion, which is US$5.6 billion. Total export earnings fall from US$20 billion to US$14.4 billion, a fall of 28 per cent.
Carry the fall into the budget
The commodity supplies 45 per cent of US$8 billion in revenue, which is US$3.6 billion. If that revenue falls in proportion to the price, it falls by 40 per cent, which is US$1.44 billion. Government revenue falls from US$8 billion to about US$6.56 billion, a fall of 18 per cent.
Answer
Export earnings fall by US$5.6 billion, or 28 per cent, and government revenue falls by about US$1.44 billion, or 18 per cent.
Is that answer sensible?
The development consequence is the fourth mark, and it is the one most answers leave out. An 18 per cent cut in revenue with no borrowing capacity forces cuts, and the spending cut first is capital spending on schools, clinics and transmission, because it has no immediate constituency. The economy therefore loses the investment that would have diversified it away from the exposure that caused the problem.
Two things worth noticing about the arithmetic. The fall in export earnings, 28 per cent, is smaller than the price fall, 40 per cent, because 30 per cent of exports were something else: that is exactly what diversification buys. And the proportional pass through to revenue is a simplifying assumption; in practice royalties on a profit base fall by more than the price does, because costs do not fall with it.
Exam question
Harder · about 11 min
6 marks
Analyse the impact of changes in the international business cycle on developing economies.
Hint 1Analyse wants channels with mechanisms, directions and lags, not a list of outcomes.
Hint 2Three channels do most of the work, and one of them runs the other way.
Hint 3Finish on why the same shock costs a developing economy more.
Where students lose marks on this one
Describing the phases of the business cycle before answering
Why it happens: It is familiar content and feels like a safe opening.
The question is about transmission and consequences. Start with the first channel.
Answering with the transmission channels from the international and regional business cycles dot point
Why it happens: The material overlaps and was learnt in that order.
Those channels are the mechanism; this question also needs the development consequence and the reason the effect is asymmetric.
Written for this site.
Through a marker’s eyes
marks
Analyse the impact of changes in the international business cycle on developing economies.
The attempt
out of
Developing economies are affected by the international business cycle because they are part of the global economy. When there is a downturn in countries like the USA and Europe, they buy less from developing countries, so their exports fall. This means less economic growth and higher unemployment. Investment also falls because investors are scared. During COVID-19 many developing countries went into recession and lost growth. This shows that globalisation has made developing countries more exposed to the international business cycle.
What the marker sees
This is a Band 3 answer that knows the right story and cannot demonstrate it. Two channels are named, trade and investment, with no mechanism under either: prices, volumes, the terms of trade, push and pull factors and the currency are all absent. "Investors are scared" is a description of an outcome standing in for an explanation. COVID is asserted rather than used: no figure, no comparison between groups of economies, and no reason the effect differed. Nothing distinguishes a developing economy from any other economy, which is the entire question. The verb is analyse, so the marks are in the mechanism and the relationships, and this response has neither.
The same answer, fixed
out of
The impact on a developing economy runs through three channels, and the size of the impact is decided less by the size of the shock than by the buffers available to absorb it.
The first channel is the export price. Commodity exporters, which is 95 of 195 economies, sell into markets whose prices are set globally and whose short run demand is inelastic, so a modest fall in world demand produces a large fall in price. Brent crude averaged about US$64 a barrel in 2019 and about US$18 in April 2020. Since export earnings also carry the royalties and resource taxes that fund a narrow tax base, the terms of trade fall, real income falls and the budget contracts at the same moment.
The second channel is capital. Flows into developing economies depend on the return relative to a safe advanced economy asset, so when the United States federal funds rate rose 5.25 percentage points between March 2022 and July 2023, capital reversed for reasons entirely external to the receiving economies. The currency falls, and where debt is owed in dollars the real burden of that debt rises as export earnings fall. Sri Lanka defaulted in May 2022 and Ghana in December 2022, without a domestic shock in either case.
The third channel works in the opposite direction and is usually omitted. Remittances are sent by workers abroad in response to need rather than return, so they are close to countercyclical for the receiving economy. Against forecasts of a 20 per cent collapse in 2020, flows to low and middle income economies fell about 1.6 per cent and then rose to about US$685 billion by 2024, which makes them the steadiest external finance many of these economies receive.
The reason the same shock costs more in a developing economy is the absence of buffers. Advanced economies met COVID with fiscal packages financed in their own currencies at near zero rates; most developing economies could not borrow at those rates or in those currencies, so support was a fraction of the need and the loss became permanent. World output fell about 2.8 per cent in 2020 and rebounded about 6.3 per cent in 2021, and that shared rebound conceals a group of economies that recovered and a group that scarred.
The development consequence outlasts the cycle. A government facing an 18 per cent revenue fall cuts capital spending first, so schools, clinics and transmission lines are delayed, and those were the investments that would have diversified the economy out of the exposure. The cycle therefore does more than move output around a trend in these economies: it removes the means of reducing the exposure, which is why the exposure persists from one cycle to the next.
Exam question
Hardest asked · about 20 min
10 marks
Evaluate the impact of the international business cycle on economic growth and development in developing economies.
Hint 1Evaluate needs a criterion. Judge the exposure against the alternative, which is a less integrated economy.
Hint 2Separate the level effect of integration from the volatility effect.
Hint 3The strongest paragraph is the one explaining why volatility itself lowers growth.
Where students lose marks on this one
Concluding that developing economies should reduce their integration
Why it happens: The damage is vivid and the counterfactual is invisible.
The least exposed economies are also the slowest growing. Evaluate the management of the exposure, not the existence of it.
Treating output volatility as the whole of the damage
Why it happens: The business cycle is taught as movement around a trend.
In a developing economy the cycle changes the trend, because the spending cut in a downturn is the investment that would have raised it.
Using only the global financial crisis as evidence
Why it happens: It is the episode most textbooks were written around.
COVID in 2020 and the 2022 to 2023 tightening are more recent, better documented and show both a real and a financial shock in sequence.
Written for this site.